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Introduction 
 
 
A defining dynamic of global environmental politics has been the dominance of ‘free’ 
market instruments as legitimate state responses to the critical issue of climate change. 
It seems that not even the “greatest and widest-ranging market failure the world has ever 
seen” is  too great for a market-fix (Stern et al. 2006:i). The Kyoto Protocol, signed in 
1997, is to date the most comprehensive international climate change agreement as the 
only treaty to mandate quantitative greenhouse gas emission reductions for developed 
countries1. It was also the first global agreement to institute market-based instruments 
for ‘carbon trading’, first at the behest of the United States, but soon embraced by the 
European Union (Newell & Paterson 2010:27). The Kyoto Protocol defines three 
specific market instruments, known as ‘flexible mechanisms’, as the institutional means 
for developed countries  to meet  their Kyoto  targets. The  first  is  ‘Emissions Trading’, 
which  permits  the  trading  of  Kyoto  ‘allowances’  between developed countries. The 
second  is  ‘Joint  Implementation’, which allows developed countries  to operate carbon 
emissions2 reducing projects in partnership with other developed countries, mostly in 
Eastern Europe.  
 
This thesis conducts a critical analysis of the third and most extensive Kyoto market 
instrument, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). The CDM encourages 
developing  country  ‘participation’  in  the  international  climate  change  regime  by 
creating  opportunities  for  carbon  pollution  reducing  ‘projects’, which  are  designed  to 
contribute towards sustainable development. CDM projects in turn produce carbon 
credits which are traded and then used by states and capital in developed countries to 
meet emission reduction requirements. This study comes at a particularly important 
                                                 
1 The terms ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ countries are used throughout this thesis, in line with the 
terminology used by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).  
2 This thesis uses ‘carbon emissions’ and ‘carbon pollution’ as generic terms for all human-induced 
greenhouse gas emissions.  
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time for the political development of the CDM. The future existence of the CDM in a 
post-Kyoto climate change agreement is a current focus of international negotiations, as 
is the integration of the CDM with domestic climate change policies. However, there is 
also a lack of critical analysis on the CDM to inform this political economic context, 
which is a deficit this thesis redresses from an ecological Marxist perspective.   
 
As alluded to, there are two formal purposes to the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM). The first is to “assist” developed countries in meeting their Kyoto commitments 
(UNFCCC 1997:11). This occurs through the production of carbon credits known as 
‘Certified Emission Reductions’ (CERs), which represent a quantity of greenhouse gas 
emissions deemed to have been ‘reduced’ by a project. Common project types include 
hydropower dam and biomass waste renewable energy projects, industrial greenhouse 
gas destruction factories, carbon sequestration from tree plantations, and energy 
efficiency installations. For example, a hydropower project in India will produce CERs 
on the basis that the project is less polluting than a coal-fired power station that would 
otherwise be operating without CDM revenue. CERs are either sold directly from 
project developers, or traded in secondary global financial markets. When surrendered, 
CERs contribute to the emissions reduction requirements of developed states, such as 
France, or companies in developed countries, such as a natural gas producer in England. 
The second purpose of the CDM is to “contribute” to ‘sustainable development’ in the 
developing countries that are hosting projects (UNFCCC 1997:11). Sustainable 
development requirements are defined by developing country governments, and are 
often used to direct investment towards priority industries. 
 
The ‘CDM market’,  which  encompasses  both  the  project  and  trading  phases  of  the 
CDM, has expanded rapidly since the first project was registered in 2005. There are 
currently 2,456 registered projects which have produced over 448 million Certified 
Emission Reductions (CERs) (UNFCCC 2010a). There are 3,040 additional projects 
awaiting registration, which in conjunction with already operating projects are projected 
to produce 1.83 billion CERs by 2012 (UNEP 2010b). The distribution of projects is 
heavily skewed towards the largest developing countries, with China, India, Brazil, and 
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Mexico accounting for over 75 percent of total projects (UNEP 2010b). The CDM has 
generated a considerable volume of ‘carbon finance’. The total price value of CERs sold 
in 2008 was US$6.5 billion and US$2.6 billion in 2009, after the CDM market 
contracted from the global economic crisis. Secondary market trading of CERs totalled 
US$23 billion and US$17.5 billion, in 2008 and 2009 respectively (Kossoy & Ambrosi 
2010:37).  
 
Carbon credits produced in the CDM have also made significant contributions to the 
publically reported greenhouse gas reductions of states and businesses. However, the 
role of carbon offsets is often overlooked in (important) public debates over headline 
emissions targets, the distribution of those targets between countries and industries, and 
appropriate domestic mechanisms such as emissions trading schemes or taxes. For 
example, the CDM is extensively integrated into European climate change policies. At 
least 88 percent of total emissions reductions in the current phase (2008-12) of the 
European Union (EU) Emissions Trading Scheme can be achieved though the purchase 
of CERs from the CDM (WWF-UK 2007:3). The CDM therefore deserves critical 
scrutiny because a large proportion of greenhouse gas emission reductions that are 
attributed to developed countries are actually taking place in CDM projects in 
developing countries.  
 
In the context of a global stalemate in international climate change negotiations, the 
expanded use of carbon offsetting instruments is one of the few points of general 
agreement between and within developed and developing states. For example, the 
Copenhagen Accord (UNFCCC 2009:2-3), from the United Nations climate conference 
in December 2009, embodies a commitment to developing a Reducing Emissions from 
Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) scheme in an otherwise indefinite 
document. REDD is a new carbon offsetting mechanism that plans to produce carbon 
credits from ‘avoided deforestation’ projects that ‘protect’ existing forests in developing 
countries. The demand for CDM credits until 2020 has also been guaranteed in the next 
phase (2013-20) of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, which allows at least 50 percent 
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of total emissions reduction to be met through Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) 
(Pew 2009:2).  
 
However, despite broad in-principle support by states for offsetting mechanisms, the 
World Bank has described the CDM market as at the “crossroads” (Kossoy & Ambrosi 
2010:38). This is because the future of the CDM depends on two broader institutional 
developments that are the subject of significant social contestation and which cannot be 
assumed will come into effect. Firstly, the state-supported nature of the CDM is such 
that its long-term existence depends on a post-Kyoto international climate change 
agreement (CDM Watch 2010a:6). There has been minimal progress to this end in 
international negotiations in the lead-up to the next major United Nations climate 
conference in Cancun, Mexico in December 2010 (Sehlleier & Michaelowa 2010a:1). 
Secondly, the continued expansion of the CDM depends on the enactment of further 
domestic emissions trading schemes because they provide the demand for CERs. 
However, outside of Europe, and aside from the recently operational scheme in New 
Zealand, the governments of the United States, Japan, and Australia have been unable to 
pass emissions trading legislation (Kolesnikov-Jessop 2010). The impasse in each 
reflects  the  contradictions  of  the  CDM’s  embeddedness  in  broader  political  and 
economic processes.      
 
Given these complexities, it is important to develop a critical understanding of the 
thirteen-year history of the CDM, including the six years of registered project activities. 
A large volume of academic, business and non-governmental organisation (NGO) 
publications already exist on different aspects of the CDM. However, in terms of the 
academic literature, there is a considerable lack of depth from a political economic 
perspective. The vast majority of approaches engage with the CDM entirely on its own 
terms, rather than problematising the instrument itself. In a comprehensive review of 
this literature, Paulsson (2009:66) found that articles commonly assess whether the 
CDM has been successful in fulfilling its ‘double  goal’  of  emissions  reductions  and 
sustainable development. A regular argument across disciplines is that the CDM in its 
current form favours the lowest-cost projects, often with questionable emissions 
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reductions, and to the detriment of the promotion of sustainable development (Paulsson 
2009:70). However, in most cases this argument simply forms the background for 
uncritical proposals for the institutional “fine-tuning” of the CDM, in order to promote 
better outcomes towards the double goal in a post-Kyoto climate change agreement 
(Paulsson 2009:76).  
 
There is a small body of work which is notable for its more critical approach to the 
CDM. These are critical interventions from above, which examine the political and 
economic dynamics of states and capital that drive the CDM, and from below, which 
chart the realities of actual CDM projects and the social movements that have resisted 
them. For example, Bachram (2004) argues that the CDM is a form of neo-colonialism 
which exacerbates global inequalities and provides fraudulent profits for large 
corporations. Bumpus and Liverman (2008) draw attention to the extensive role of 
international and national state actors in the commodification of carbon in offset form. 
Lohmann (2006) provides a critique of the neo-classical economic foundations of the 
CDM market, which facilitate the further extraction and combustion of fossil fuels. 
Böhm and Dabhi (2009) collect extensive case studies on the negative impacts on the 
local communities and environments that surround CDM projects, including the 
dispossession of land, pollution of ecosystems, and human rights abuses. 
 
This thesis makes a political economic contribution towards a more critical and 
theoretically informed understanding of the CDM. It problematises the CDM by 
considering whether it is an environmental or economic instrument. To this end, the 
thesis combines an understanding of the historical tendencies and essential relations of 
the capitalist-dominated social formation, with an appreciation of the contingencies and 
socially contested nature of its future development. The overarching narrative is 
informed by  the socialist  ecology of  James O’Connor’s  (1998) project on  the  ‘second 
contradiction of capitalism’. O’Connor’s theory, and subsequent interventions, form an 
‘ecological Marxist’ framework for studying the general tendency of capitalism to 
degrade the natural environment, as well as human labour power, and spatial 
infrastructure. The second contradiction theorises the role of capitalist social relations 
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and productive forces in undermining the natural environment, and the social forces that 
contest and constitute the process.  
 
Following the ecological Marxist tradition, the thesis argues that the CDM is a dynamic 
state-led means for permitting the accumulation of capital through the potential social 
barriers that surround the politics of global warming. While O’Connor’s theory is strong 
in its investigation of state restructuring and barriers to production, it is underdeveloped 
in terms of the importance of spatial configurations to these processes. This thesis 
makes a theoretical contribution towards the integration of spatial dynamics into 
O’Connor’s  theory  by  using  the CDM as a case study for exploring the ways that 
capitalism restructures global and local space in order to displace second contradictions 
through space and time. However, the social and ecological impacts of this 
displacement, and the continual contestation between states, capital, and social 
movements, define the process as inherently contradictory. Qualitative and quantitative 
evidence is used to illustrate the arguments, and is largely drawn from United Nations 
statistics, scientific reports, field studies by civil society groups, academic accounts of 
international negotiations, and media sources.  
 
The scope and argument of the thesis is developed over four chapters. Drawing on 
O’Connor’s project, Chapter one constructs the theoretical framework underpinning the 
thesis. It defends O’Connor’s  theory  against  criticisms  that  it  is  capital-centric, state-
centric, and determinist, but integrates criticisms on the importance of agency in order 
to develop a theoretical framework that emphasises the contingency of social processes 
surrounding crises of the second contradiction. The chapter then applies the theory to 
the practical concern of climate change by conceptualising fossil fuels, land, and the 
climate system as conditions of production. It discusses the contradictions between 
capitalist social relations and the climate system, and the idea of potential natural 
barriers to capital, as the context for understanding the social processes that produced 
the CDM. 
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Having established the problem of climate change, Chapter two continues its 
application of O’Connor’s theory by conceptualising the climate system as an object of 
political contestation. It analyses the CDM as a response to climate change in the 
context of the contestation over the climate system between states, capital, and social 
movements at the international level. The chapter argues that the CDM is an instrument 
created by pro-active states to overcome potential social barriers to capital from the 
demands of social movements, by permitting the accumulation of capital through crisis. 
It demonstrates how the CDM uses global space to restructure the climate system as a 
productive force, and specifies, in contradiction to its ideological foundations as a 
market instrument, the new forms of state-supported social relations that are required 
for the functioning of the CDM market.  
 
Chapter three shifts to an empirical examination of CDM projects. In particular, it 
focuses on the negative impacts caused by the displacement of the climate change crisis 
through space to the level of CDM projects. It argues that the accumulation imperatives 
of the CDM are based on a particular capital-nature relationship: the capitalisation of 
nature. However, the CDM institutes only a partial capitalisation of nature, which 
restructures local space surrounding CDM projects. This has resulted in the 
development of a dual character in the CDM, whereby the capitalisation of carbon sinks 
depends on the appropriation of nature. A case study of Indian CDM projects is used to 
illustrate the negative impacts of this appropriation on local communities and 
ecosystems surrounding projects, and the role of ‘sustainable development’ discourse in 
facilitating and legitimising the process.  
 
Finally, Chapter four evaluates the temporal dimensions of the CDM as a response to 
climate change, and considers the implications of some current social struggles over the 
CDM. It argues that in addition to the partial capitalisation of nature, the CDM only 
notionally capitalises carbon sinks. This renders the CDM an ultimately false means of 
maintaining the climate system, and therefore displaces the climate change crisis 
through time by intensifying future global warming. Secondly, it analyses instances of 
social contestation between states, capital, and social movements at the international, 
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national, and local levels. The chapter argues that these conflicts represent emerging 
contradictions within the state social structures which wholly support the CDM market.  
 
In concluding, the combination of the capital accumulation imperatives of the CDM and 
its negative social and ecological impacts, define the CDM as an economic rather than 
environmental instrument. However, the contradictions of such instruments, which 
characterise the current state of global climate change politics, demonstrate the role of 
ever-present contestation in shaping the dynamics of the CDM, and underscoring the 
continual social construction of second contradictions. 
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Chapter one 
Global warming and the second contradiction of 
capitalism 
 
 
James O’Connor’s formulation of the ‘second contradiction of capitalism’ theorises the 
contradictions between capitalist social relations and the natural environment. This 
framework forms the conceptual basis of this thesis because of its insight into the 
environment as an object of social contestation. The first section of the chapter 
articulates an understanding of the second contradiction which appreciates the tendency 
for capital to impair its own conditions while emphasising the contingency of the 
surrounding social processes. The  section  explicates  the  meanings  of  ‘conditions  of 
production’  and  ‘crisis’  in  O’Connor’s  theory,  and  engages  with  criticisms  that  the 
framework is capital- and state-centric, determinist, and downplays the importance of 
agency. This discussion is used to develop a theoretical position which stresses the 
agency of social movements, capital, and states as social forces in capitalist social 
formations and whose contestation can constitute crises of the second contradiction.  
 
The second section of the chapter begins to apply this framework in an ecological 
Marxist account of climate change. The account is framed around two general questions 
posed by O’Connor (1998:165), with respect to the specific concern of global warming. 
First, “does capital create its own barriers and limits by destroying its own production 
conditions?”.  Second,  “why  does  capital  impair  its  own  conditions?”.  The section 
conceptualises climate change in terms of the use values of fossil fuels, land, and the 
climate system as conditions of production. It argues that global warming represents an 
emerging socially and naturally constituted second contradiction of capitalism. This 
forms the contextual basis for the critical analysis of the politicisation of the climate 
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system, which led to the creation of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), in the 
following chapter.  
 
Developing a theoretical framework 
 
O’Connor’s  theory3 of  the  ‘second  contradiction  of  capitalism’  extends Marxist  crisis 
theory to ecological concerns. Specifically, it focuses on the tendency for capital to 
impair its own conditions of production, and the natural and social forces that surround 
this  process.  The  notion  of  ‘conditions  of  production’  or  ‘production  conditions’  is 
based on a synthesis of the ideas of Karl Marx and Karl Polanyi. Three production 
conditions  are  identified  in  different  parts  of Marx’s  writings:  “personal  conditions”, 
which  refers  to  labour  power;  “general  conditions”,  which  refers  to  human-made 
infrastructure and space; and “external physical conditions”, which refers to the natural 
environment (O’Connor 1998:145-6). O’Connor (1998:144) recognises that Marx used 
the notion of production conditions in differing ways, and therefore borrows from 
Polanyi’s  notion  of  ‘fictitious  commodities’ to systematise the concept. Polanyi 
(1944:72) identified land, labour, and money as fictitious commodities because 
capitalism organises them in commodity form, but their essence is as nature, human 
beings, and purchasing power, rather than as produced commodities. Polanyi’s 
conceptualisation clarifies the term ‘production conditions’ to mean “everything that is 
not  produced  as  a  commodity  but  that  is  treated  as  if  it  is  a  commodity”  (O’Connor 
1998:125). Therefore, conditions of production are all human, spatial, and natural 
requirements for capitalist accumulation that are immediately produced and reproduced 
outside of the circuit of capital.  
 
The second contradiction of capitalism is crisis theory which pertains to the conditions 
of production. The second contradiction is additional to, but interrelated with, the ‘first 
contradiction  of  capitalism’,  or  realisation  crisis,  in  Marxist  theory  (O’Connor 
                                                 
3 Refers to O’Connor’s ‘ecological Marxist’ work, beginning with O’Connor (1988) and collected in 
O’Connor (1998). 
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1998:176). A realisation crisis is a demand-side crisis with its basis in the capital-labour 
contradiction. The contradiction is due to the dual character of wage labour as both a 
cost of production and a source of demand. The sum of individual capitals depressing 
wages as a cost  of  production  can  manifest  as  an  ‘overproduction  of  capital’  more 
generally because there is limited scope for the realisation of surplus value (Marx 
1957:316n, O’Connor 1998:176). On the other hand, a crisis of the second contradiction 
is a supply-side crisis with its basis in the capital-conditions contradiction. The 
contradiction is due to the general tendency of capitalist productive forces and social 
relations of production to impair rather than reproduce the human, natural, and spatial 
conditions of capitalist production (O’Connor 1998:164). Environmental damage can in 
turn endanger the accumulation process due to increased costs to capital which can 
result from social demands for environmental protection, or the hindrances of operating 
under impaired conditions. These circumstances may require the diversion of increasing 
quantities of surplus value away from more productive uses, potentially resulting in an 
‘underproduction of capital’ (O’Connor 1998:177).  
 
The cause of impairment and its social and natural implications has been the subject of 
many  critiques  of  O’Connor’s  project.  One  form of criticism questions the specific 
relationship between capitalism and ecological damage. Toledo (1992:86) cites 
historical examples of ecological damage in non-capitalist ancient Greece and Rome 
and ex-socialist  bloc  countries  to  question  the  “ecological  guilt  of  capitalism”. 
O’Connor’s theory does not deny non-capitalist drivers of damage, but does identify a 
number of specifically capitalist reasons why capital degrades the environment. In the 
abstract  these  include capital’s  self-expanding nature and its lack of ownership of the 
conditions  of  production  (O’Connor  1998:165). Capital’s  requirement  for  quantitative 
expansion  through  time  and  space  means  that  capitalism’s  use  of  the  natural 
environment is likely to progressively intensify and therefore degrade essentially 
qualitative4 natural materials and processes (Altvater 1994:77, Kovel 2002:38). 
Secondly, because natural materials and processes are conditions of production, they are 
produced and reproduced ecologically and therefore fall outside the control of single 
                                                 
4 Ecological systems are qualitative in the sense that material and energy levels remain at the same 
quantities but are changed qualitatively through natural or human ‘regrouping’ (Altvater 1993:199). 
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capitals, which both cannot and have no reason to individually maintain them (Altvater 
1993:219-20, Kovel 2002:40, Lebowitz 1992:93). It is important to recognise these 
specifically capitalist drivers of second contradictions due to the dominance of the 
capitalist mode of production in the global social formation, without assuming that 
capitalism is the only driver of ecological damage. Secondly, it is fundamentally 
capitalist-dominated societies that are confronting ecological damage, regardless of its 
cause.  O’Connor’s  project  is  rich  as  a  framework  for  analysing  the  dynamics  and 
contradictions of these processes in the climate change problematic.   
 
O’Connor (1998:176) also stresses that the particular way in which the abstract ‘laws’ 
of capitalism manifest in the concrete is always a social and political question and needs 
to be investigated as such. A misreading of this method has led others to criticise 
O’Connor’s  theory  as  deterministic.  Foster  (2002:10-11) argues against perceived 
“feedback  mechanisms”  from  the  natural  environment  and  social  movements  which 
increase costs to capital and push capitalism towards sustainable practices. Instead of a 
crisis of underproduction, he asserts that capital can accumulate in spite of ecological 
destruction and even profit from it through environmental clean-up industries. However, 
there are no automatic mechanisms involved in O’Connor’s formulation of  the second 
contradiction. Instead, the manifestation of a particular form of ecological damage, in 
interaction with the totality of ecological crises, as a cost or opportunity to capital, an 
economic crisis, or any number of other potential possibilities, depends on social, 
political,  and  ideological  contestation  (O’Connor  1998:165). This point reflects this 
thesis’ more nuanced understanding of crises of the second contradiction as processes 
which are uneven in their effects and are the subject of continual and concrete social 
construction and contestation. 
 
While there is no inevitability of outcomes  in  O’Connor’s  formulation,  Rosewarne 
(1997) has argued  that O’Connor’s  theory demonstrates an  inadequate  appreciation of 
the import of agency within its emphasis on social contestation. One side of this critique 
is  based  on  O’Connor’s  focus  on  natural  limits rather than social processes as the 
primary path towards the second contradiction (Rosewarne 1997:114). Natural barriers 
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to production are undeniably one of the two paths to the second contradiction. They 
arise when impaired natural conditions decrease the flexibility of capital by presenting 
as physical hindrances and increased costs to a particular production process5 
(O’Connor 1998:242). But  the danger in  focusing on natural barriers  is  that  it reduces 
any  social  contestation  to  a  “reactive  process”,  rather  than  indicative  of  a  proactive 
agency of civil society that can be the basis of, rather than a response to, a crisis of the 
second contradiction (Rosewarne 1997:112). This thesis emphasises such agency on the 
part of social movements, capital, and states, as underpinning the social contingency of 
the historical development of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).  
 
Social contestation between active forces represents the second path towards a second 
contradiction of capitalism. The demands of social movements have the potential to 
manifest  as  a  social  barrier  to  the  flexibility  of  capital’s  relationship  with  nature, 
through direct actions or public campaigns, as well as from state regulatory restrictions 
(O’Connor 1998:242). The place of structure and agency in these demands is the subject 
of a  second side of Rosewarne’s  (1997:105) critique when he argues that O’Connor’s 
theory structurally privileges labour movements to the detriment of the agency of ‘new 
social movements’. O’Connor (1998:12,26) contends that the place of the working class 
is structurally defined in struggles over production conditions because the impairment 
of production conditions is a concrete labour process and therefore the maintenance of 
those conditions is in the interests of labour. Similarly, the place of social movements 
such as environmental and indigenous groups is also structurally defined because 
production  conditions  are  “more  than  class  issues”  in that they are conditions of life 
itself  (O’Connor 1998:14). However, while structural positioning and the existence of 
interests is important for underscoring the possibility of contestation, active engagement 
is always contingent on the agency of relevant actors (Rosewarne 1998:110). The 
importance of class struggle in the development of global warming is acknowledged, 
                                                 
5 Natural barriers from second contradictions are, by definition, barriers of ‘second nature’ because the 
impairment of natural conditions by capital denotes the transformation of natural materials and processes 
by human beings (Rosewarne 1997:115). Also, natural barriers are always socially constructed because 
they are relative to the particular requirements of individual capitals (Rosewarne 1997:116). 
14 
 
but this thesis focuses primarily on environmental, indigenous, and peasant movements 
whose agency is evident in their engagement with the politics of the CDM.     
 
Social movements are afforded further importance due to the significance of states in 
struggles around the second contradiction, which defines conditions of production as 
politicised to sites outside of the immediate production process (O’Connor 1998:152). 
States must regulate capital’s  access to and use of conditions of production because 
natural conditions like fossil fuels are produced and reproduced outside the circuit of 
capital (O’Connor  1998:148). Indeed, securing access for capital to nature, labour 
power, and infrastructure has been one of the  central  ‘functions’  of  states  (O’Connor 
1998:149). This role means that states are both partly responsible for any impairment of 
the natural conditions of production, but also central to any possible “reconstruction” of 
those conditions (O’Connor 1998:155). States often reconstruct both natural conditions 
as  “productive  forces”  and  the  “social  relations  of  [their]  reproduction”  as  a  result  of 
potential social and natural barriers to capital (O’Connor 1998:167-8). Kabra (1992:89) 
has argued that O’Connor’s formulation tends to be “state centric” in this regard, to the 
detriment of alternative social arrangements to ecological issues. The CDM is 
fundamentally an example of state-based restructuring and this point is emphasised in 
the thesis. However, the state is conceptualised in non-functionalist terms as a contested 
social relation and an active and dynamic social force in the development of the CDM 
and the constitution of climate change as a second contradiction of capitalism. 
 
An ecological Marxist account of climate change  
 
Nature has use values  to  capital  as  a  “tap”  for material  inputs  to production and as  a 
“sink” for waste outputs from production (O’Connor 1998:185). Use value refers to the 
qualitative and quantitative utility  of  a  “thing”, such as a commodity or fictitious 
commodity, for a particular “use”, such as production or consumption (Marx 1976:125). 
The use values of fossil fuels, land, and the climate system as taps and/or sinks are 
useful in conceptualising these elements as conditions of capitalist production, and 
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understanding how and why the use values of fossil fuels and land to capital have 
resulted in an impairment of the use values of the climate system. 
 
Fossil fuels as a tap 
Fossil fuels, such as coal, gas, and oil, are natural conditions of production because they 
are produced through natural processes but treated by capital as if they are commodities. 
They are natural conditions because they are produced outside the circuit of capital 
through geological processes which concentrate and store carbon energy that is 
absorbed by plants (Gautier 2008:60). Fossil fuels are conditions of production in the 
form of a tap because they have use values in increasing labour productivity and as 
material inputs for capital and consumer goods. Capitalist accumulation is a process of 
continual self-expansion through a circuit of capital in which surplus value is produced 
by  labour  then  reinvested again  (O’Connor 1998:178). The combustion of  fossil  fuels 
aids the production of surplus value by increasing relative surplus value6. This is 
because fossil fuels facilitate technological change by powering machinery and 
transport which increases labour productivity by replacing concrete labour (Clark & 
York 2005:405, Harvey 1982:29-31). Fossil fuels also have use values as material 
inputs to many capital and consumer goods and an exchange value as tradable 
commodities. For example, oil is an input in plastics and fertiliser, and is traded as a 
separate commodity in its own right (Gautier 2008:124).  
 
The historical development of industrial capitalism has been dependent on fossil fuel-
based energy sources, which in physical terms are particularly useful to capital because 
they can be stored and used independently of the time and place of their source 
(Altvater 2006:41). In social terms, capital’s access to fossil fuels in desired quantities 
and qualities and at the required time and place has been underpinned by states. For 
example, this was explicit in the title of the Australian Government’s  (2004)  most 
                                                 
6 Relative surplus value is derived from higher labour productivity in one company, often technologically 
driven, relative to the social average. When taken up by other companies through competition, there is a 
reduction in socially necessary labour time and an increase in profit rates in an industry as a whole 
(Harvey 1982:30-31, O’Connor 1998:178-9).  
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recent energy White Paper Securing Australia’s Energy Future, which sought to assure 
low-cost access to fossil fuel energy sources through state policies such as large 
subsidies for offshore petroleum exploration7. National and international also states use 
‘soft’  and  ‘hard’  measures  ranging  from  free-trade diplomacy at the World Trade 
Organisation to military operations by the United States and allies in oil-producing 
territories (Altvater 2006:51). However, these historically state functions have been the 
subject of considerable resistance by peace, ecology, and anti/alter-globalisation 
movements.   
 
Land as a tap 
Land is also a natural condition because its component parts, such as soils, nutrients, 
and trees are produced and reproduced by ecological rather than labour processes. It is a 
condition of production in the form of a tap because it has use values as an element of 
agricultural production, a source for the extraction of forest products and minerals, and 
in providing the general space required for all capitalist production (Marx 1971:774). 
For example, more fertile soils increase labour productivity in agriculture and therefore 
aid the production of surplus value by increasing relative surplus value (Harvey 
1982:335). Like fossil fuels, land itself also has an exchange value in the form of rent 
accrued to landowners. But land use per se has not been as intertwined with the history 
of industrial capitalism as the use of fossil fuels. Rather, land has been a condition of all 
human life from the hunter-gatherer phase of human history that began over one 
hundred thousand years ago, to the development of agriculture around twelve thousand 
years ago (Boyden & Dovers 1997:14-21). Indeed, around the onset of industrial 
capitalism in 1750, six to seven percent of the  Earth’s  surface  was  cultivated  for 
agriculture, which had reduced total global forest area by four to seven percent (IPCC 
2007a:182-3). 
 
                                                 
7 This form of state support is replicated around the world. De Moor (2001:168-9) estimates that between 
1995 and 1998 governments around the world gave fossil fuel industries US$151 billion in subsidies such 
as direct grants, bail-outs, tax concessions, provision of infrastructure and research and development. 
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However, the historical development of capitalism has been intertwined with private 
property in land, which excluded people from land as a necessary pre-condition for the 
existence of wage labour (Harvey 1982:343-4). Private ownership of land does not 
automatically translate to purely capitalist relations on that land, and nor is all land 
private, with state, communal, and customary forms of land remaining in existence 
(Harvey 1982:344). Nonetheless, the history of industrial capitalism has coincided with 
significant growth in both the spatial reach and intensity of land use, and continues to 
do so in Latin America, Africa, and south and south-east Asia (IPCC 2007b:182).  By 
1990, 30 to 35 percent of global land area was used for agriculture, and 20 to 29 percent 
of global forest area had been deforested (IPCC 2007b:182-3). Like fossil fuels, states 
have had a significant role in securing land as a natural condition of production for 
capital. For example, Australian colonial and national states used the ‘Torrens title’ land 
registration system as a legal protection for mining, agricultural, and forestry interests 
against Aboriginal land claims8 (Anderson 2010:12). However, these processes have 
also been socially contested by a series of Aboriginal land rights movements beginning 
in the early nineteenth century (Reynolds 1992:81). 
 
The climate system as a tap and sink 
The climate system is condition of capitalist production in the form of a tap in providing 
necessary climatic conditions and a sink for greenhouse gas emissions. The climate 
system includes five main components: the atmosphere; oceans (hydrosphere); ice 
sheets and glaciers (cryosphere); land surface; and plants and animals (biosphere) 
(IPCC 2001:87). The components interact with each other outside the circuit of capital 
through complex geological, biological, and chemical processes. One of functions of 
these processes is to absorb, exchange, and store naturally and socially occurring carbon 
emissions, which regulates radiation levels from the Sun on Earth based on the level of 
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere (IPCC 2001:89). This ‘radiative balance’ is one of 
the determining factors for the climate, which includes long term temperature, wind, 
humidity, and rainfall patterns (Whitaker 2007:23). These climatic conditions define the 
climate as a “life-support service” for the capitalist economy as a whole and the whole 
                                                 
8 British, French and Belgian colonial states used the same model across Africa from the nineteenth 
century to secure land for ‘settlers’ (Dickerman et al. 1989:viii-ix, Anderson 2010:12-13). 
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of life itself (Hamilton 1997:54). For example, as a condition of production, nuclear 
power stations require the climate system to regulate water temperatures to below a 
certain level needed for their cooling (Stern et al. 2006:5). More importantly, the Earth’s 
particular climatic conditions combine in a unique way in the known universe to 
produce “the suitable conditions for life” (Whitaker 2007:11). 
 
The process of absorbing, exchanging and storing greenhouse gases, also defines the 
climate system as a natural condition of production in the form of a carbon sink. This is 
a use value to capitalist production and consumption because the concrete labour 
processes of combusting fossil fuels and various land use practices results in the 
emission of greenhouse gases, such as carbon dioxide and methane, into the 
atmosphere. The most relevant component parts of the climate system to the temporal 
scope of this study are the atmosphere, land and ocean (Gautier 2008:70). The ocean 
acts a sink because it dissolves carbon at colder temperatures, but also releases carbon at 
warmer temperatures (Le Quere and Metzl 2004:243). The biosphere, which is made up 
of predominantly living organisms including plants, animals, and soil absorbs carbon 
through photosynthesis and releases carbon through respiration (Foley and Ramankutty 
2004:279). The relationship between the ocean and biosphere carbon sinks regulates 
greenhouse gas levels in the atmosphere’s carbon sink.  
 
The impairment of the climate system  
The climate system has been impaired as a condition of production in the form of a 
carbon sink. On the one hand, the greenhouse gases emitted from capital’s use of fossil 
fuels have exceeded the carbon sink capacity of the oceans and the biosphere. Similarly, 
capital’s use of land for agriculture and forestry has caused the biosphere to act as a net 
source of carbon emissions since 1800. On the other hand, capital’s use of fossil fuels 
has reduced the carbon sink capacity of oceans due to the acidification caused by carbon 
emissions.  Secondly,  capital’s  use  of  land,  particularly  deforestation,  has  reduced  the 
carbon sink capacity of the biosphere (IPCC 2007b:37, Sabine et al. 2004:367-70). 
Capital in developed countries has been the principal, but not only cause of this 
impairment. On one the hand, developed countries have contributed to about 56 percent 
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of total greenhouse gas emissions since 1950 (Roberts 2001:501). On the other hand, 
there has been a large exporting in greenhouse gas emissions from developed to 
developing countries. For example, essentially all growth in carbon dioxide emissions in 
the  ‘less  developed  countries’9 between 1980 and 1996 was due to foreign capital 
investment (Grimes & Kentor 2003:267).  
 
This flooding of a contracting carbon sink resulted in approximately 43 percent of 
greenhouse gases emitted by human activity between 1800 and 1994 remaining in the 
atmosphere (Sabine et al. 2004:370). Correspondingly, the level of atmospheric carbon 
has risen from about 280 parts per million in 1750 to about 379 parts per million in 
2005 (IPCC 2007b:37). The impairment of the climate system as a carbon sink is 
causing a warming and changing of the climate which in turn is impairing the climate 
system as a climatic tap. The growth in atmospheric carbon levels has increased both 
global surface and ocean temperatures over the past one hundred years. Global surface 
temperatures are projected to increase by up to 6.4 degrees Celsius by 2100 compared 
with 1990 levels (IPCC 2007b:45).  
 
Climate change represents an emerging natural barrier to production because it will 
undermine the quantity and quality of each type of production condition – natural, 
general, and human – currently required by capital at particular times and places. For 
example, the quantity and quality of water available to capital as a natural condition of 
agricultural production will be affected due to a decreased availability of freshwater, 
altered rainfall patterns, and increased water pollution, particularly in arid and semi-arid 
climates (IPCC 2007b:36,38,42). Labour power will be impacted from the negative 
health impacts of climate change, such as rising malnutrition, diarrhoea, malaria, and 
cardio-respiratory diseases, particularly in tropical developing countries (IPCC 
2007b:43). Likewise, spatial production conditions such as transport facilities will be 
damaged by a higher incidence and severity of extreme weather events and sea level 
rises, particularly in coastal urban areas (IPCC 2007b:40). These examples are potential 
                                                 
9 Defined as countries with a per capita GNP of less that US$15,000 in 1980 (Grimes & Kentor 
2003:267). 
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natural barriers to production because they represent concrete physical hindrances to 
production, relative to the particular requirements of capital. One prominent estimate of 
the costs associated with such impacts is five to ten percent of global gross domestic 
product by 2100 (Stern et al. 2006:ix). Despite clear inadequacies in the calculation of 
such figures10, its magnitude demonstrates the potential for an underproduction of 
capital crisis on the scale of a second contradiction of capitalism.    
 
Capital has threatened its own conditions of existence by triggering global warming 
because of its self-expansionary nature, and its lack of ownership of production 
conditions  (O’Connor  1998:165). The capitalist drive for expansion subordinates use 
value to exchange value, and concrete labour to abstract labour (O’Connor 1998:327). 
As outlined above, fossil fuels and fertile land have use values in increasing labour 
productivity. This pushes concrete labour closer towards abstract labour by reducing the 
socially necessary labour time for the production of individual commodities like cars or 
cotton. Pending the state of the first contradiction, a reduction in socially necessary 
labour time increases the total quantity of surplus value that can be produced and 
realised, which augments the total circuit of capital. This dynamic of continual 
expansion overrides the negative use values from climate change (as well as depletion 
of resources and soil quality) that may push costs up for capital more generally. One of 
the key reasons for this subordination with respect to natural conditions of production is 
because their reproduction falls outside of the control of individual capitals. Therefore, 
no individual capital has a short-term interest in the reproduction of the climate system 
if the costs associated with impairment and reproduction can be shifted (Lebowitz 
1992:93). The analysis of the CDM in the following chapters demonstrates the 
prevalence of such cost shifting in the politics of climate change.    
 
 
                                                 
10 One of many reasons is because aggregate GDP measures do not distinguish between defensive or 
positive expenditures. For example, clean-up operations appear as a positive in GDP terms, without 
increasing ‘welfare’ or taking into account the ‘opportunity cost’ from the loss of more productive 
expenditure. Furthermore, it does not indicate the distribution of costs, which will be particularly unequal 
for a global GDP figure (Splash 2007:711-2). 
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Conclusion: Bringing in society and the state 
 
While capital has undermined its own conditions of existence in effecting global 
warming, capital’s damaging use of production conditions can be restricted if “society 
forces it to do so” (Marx 1976:381 [quote], Lebowitz 1992:93). One of the key drivers 
of such demands is the assertion of alternative conceptions of production conditions as 
conditions of life by social movements, such as environmental groups. The threats to the 
conditions of production that were outlined above can be, and are, conceived of as 
threats to life more generally. Water, human health, and coastal land are all conditions 
of life that are supported by the climate system. Notwithstanding the many instances of 
successful community regulation of environments throughout history (Angus 2008), the 
institutions to which the demands of social movements are directed, and which also 
have the capacity to coordinate the reproduction of the climate system, are national and 
international states. This chapter has conceptualised climate change as a second 
contradiction of capitalism, which has been aided by state support of fossil fuels and 
land (O’Connor 1998:155). Conversely, the following chapter considers the possibility 
of states, as contested social relations that are shaped by the demands of social 
movements and capital, instituting a restructuring of the capital-climate system 
relationship in response to the problem of global warming.  
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Chapter two 
The origins of the Clean Development Mechanism: 
Overcoming social barriers to capital 
 
 
The previous chapter argued that the environmental and social impacts of climate 
change will manifest as natural barriers to capitalist production. An ecological Marxist 
perspective must also analyse the social forces that constitute and contest all second 
contradictions. This chapter focuses on the development, design, and operation of the 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) as the product of social contestation over 
global warming at the international level. It does so in the context of a third question: 
“why  do  social  struggles  against  the  destruction  of  production  conditions...potentially 
impair capital flexibility and variability?” (O’Connor 1998:165-6). The question signals 
the change in emphasis from natural barriers to social barriers to production. The first 
section examines how the climate system became politicised around the negotiation of 
the Kyoto Protocol, and why this social contestation had the potential to materialise as a 
social barrier to capital. The second and third sections analyse the development of the 
CDM, arguing that the CDM is a state-led means for capital to overcome potential 
social barriers by accumulating through those barriers. The fourth section 
conceptualises how the CDM uses the global space to restructure the climate system as 
a productive force. Lastly, the fifth section argues that in contradiction to its ideological 
underpinnings as a market instrument, the CDM market is underpinned by social 
relations that are wholly constituted by states.  
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The politicisation of the climate system 
 
Social movements played an important role in politicising the climate system to the 
level of the United Nations. The necessary role of states in regulating and provisioning 
the conditions of capitalist production embeds those conditions in civil society. 
Consequently, the provision and regulation of production conditions is a contested 
process  between  states,  capital,  and  also  social  movements  (O’Connor  1998:152-3). 
Therefore, any restructuring of conditions of production as a result of impending social 
or natural barriers to capital, such as those thrown up from the impairment of the 
climate system, is contingent on social, political, and ideological contestation 
(O’Connor  1998:165).  Contestation  over  state  provision  of  fossil  fuels  and  land as 
production conditions by anti-war and indigenous movements is one such example. 
During the 1980s, the politicisation of these conditions extended to the climate system 
in response to mounting scientific evidence of global warming (Paterson 1996:29). 
 
The politicisation of the climate system was driven by the active public campaigning of 
environmental groups in the late 1980s, which impelled the addition of global warming 
alongside deforestation and biodiversity loss as a popular environmental concern of the 
time. The largest was the Climate Action Network (CAN), which was established in 
1989 as a conglomeration of many of the large environmental NGOs, mostly from 
developed countries, such as Greenpeace International and the Environmental Defense 
Fund (Newell 2000:126). One of the priorities of CAN was to put significant pressure 
on national governments, especially the United States, to successfully negotiate an 
international climate change convention in the lead up to the United Nations Earth 
Summit in Rio in 1992 (Newell 2000:130). In developing countries, groups such as the 
Centre for Science and Environment in India were developing another political current 
that would be significant for the CDM, stressing equity principles such as historical 
responsibility  and  warning  against  “environmental  colonialism”  (Agarwal  &  Narain 
1991).  
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The politicisation of the climate system was also the first instance of ‘displacement’ that 
has characterised many climate change policies, including the CDM. The political 
nature of conditions of production causes immediate environmental and economic crises 
to be “displaced” to the level of states, transforming “crises of capitalism” to “political 
crises within capitalism”  (Hay  1994:85,  italics  in  original).  This  was  the  political 
strategy of the environmental movement, which was successful in displacing climate 
change on to the international state level at the United Nations Earth Summit in Rio in 
1992. Displacement to states is both necessary and problematic. It is necessary because 
a global response between states represents the central possibility for addressing global 
environmental issues like climate change. It is problematic because states have also 
developed strategies of “crisis displacement”, which prevent them from addressing root 
social and economic causes of those issues11 (Hay 1994:85,89).  
 
The Earth Summit set the parameters for the proceeding international contestation over 
the climate system by producing the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC). The objective of the convention is the “stabilisation of greenhouse 
gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system” (UNFCCC 1992:4). The objective 
represented a recognition by states of the need to restructure the capital-climate system 
relationship to prevent its further impairment. The boundaries of the objective are 
specified in the Convention’s three general goals. First, that the climate system as a 
condition life itself; “allow[s] ecosystems to adapt naturally”. Second,  that the climate 
system as a condition of human livelihoods; “ensure[s] that food production is not 
threatened”.  Third,  that the climate system as a condition of capitalist production; 
“enable[s] economic  development  to  proceed  in  a  sustainable  manner”  (UNFCCC 
1992:4). The latter goal was the dominating parameter in the negotiation of the CDM. 
                                                 
11 An example of a state strategy of crisis displacement is the disposal of ‘e-waste’ from disused 
electronic goods which contain toxic chemicals. It is estimated that the United States, which has not 
ratified the ‘Basel Convention’ on hazardous wastes, exports 50-80 percent of its e-waste to countries like 
China and India. The United States displaces the problem through space, rather than addressing its cause, 
such as through mandating less toxic production, or challenging consumerism (Greenpeace International 
2009). 
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The negotiation of the Clean Development Mechanism 
 
In contests over conditions of production, livelihoods, and life itself, the demands of 
social movements represent potential social barriers  to  the  flexibility  of  capital’s 
relationship with nature. Conversely, inflexibility is inimical to the self-expansionary 
drive of capital as a social relation. At the interface of this tension is the state, due to its 
role in regulating access to and use of production conditions (O’Connor 1998:153). The 
CDM was negotiated as part of the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC. Parties to the 
UNFCCC are all national states, and therefore in the last instance the CDM was a 
product of negotiation between states12. The previous chapter gave an account of the 
role of states in securing fossil fuel energy and land as conditions of capitalist 
production. Drawing on James O’Connor’s (1973:6, italics in original) previous work in 
the F iscal Crisis of the State13, this regulation can be understood in terms of “two basic 
and often mutually contradictory functions – accumulation and legitimisation”.  
 
In seeking to fulfil the accumulation function14, states are ‘capitalist states’ (O’Connor 
1998:154). Capitalist states provide capital with access to a quantity and quality of 
production conditions, such as labour or oil, at a time and place required for the 
accumulation of capital. In contrast, the legitimacy function means that states must also 
be  ‘states  in  capitalist  society’  (O’Connor  1998:154).  States  in  capitalist  society, 
particularly democratic societies, are required to regulate production conditions in a 
                                                 
12 The discussion of states in this thesis refers to both national states, such as the Brazilian state, and 
international states, such as the United Nations, which is both made up of national states, and has its own 
institutional structure.  
13 The F iscal Crisis of the State was a study on post-World War II United States, but the two state 
imperatives identified by O’Connor in 1973 remain applicable today.   
14 In a new Introduction to the book, O’Connor defended his work against critics that labelled the 
identification of ‘functions’ as ‘functionalist’. O’Connor (2001:107-8, italics in original) defines 
functionalism as the belief that “the system generates certain needs and also the political, administrative, 
and fiscal means by which these needs can be met or fulfilled”. The use of the term ‘functions’ in this 
chapter is not a functionalist understanding of the state, because while capital needs state support, there is 
no reason to believe that support will necessarily be forthcoming or effective.  
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manner that is viewed as legitimate by civil society within and across state borders. 
These functions are contingent on social construction because there are many potential 
paths for capital accumulation, and many interpretations of legitimacy. Ultimately, 
dominant paths and interpretations will be decided by the political power of social 
movements, capital, and states (O’Connor 1998:165). In such contests, states not only 
respond to the demands of capital or social movements, but are an active and dynamic 
force in creating new paths for capital accumulation, and in shaping definitions of 
legitimacy.  
 
The  legitimacy  function  explains  why  one  of  the  “crisis  displacement  strategies”  of 
states  is  to  address  “subject  perceptions  of  crisis”  (Hay  1994:88).  Climate  change 
debates were, and continue to be, framed around numerical emissions reduction targets 
and their distribution between countries and industries. Indeed, the public campaigns of 
Climate Action Network (CAN) in the lead up to, and at, the Kyoto conference focused 
on highlighting developed countries’  historical  contribution  to  climate  change, and 
pushing for binding targets of 20 percent emissions reduction from 1990 levels by 2005 
(Newell 2000:126, Betsill 2002:53).  Kyoto’s  final  target  of  an  average  5.2  percent 
reduction in the volume of greenhouse gas emissions from 1990 levels between 2008 
and 2012 was a compromise between the positions of negotiating states. European states 
pushed for absolute reduction targets of up to 15 percent from 1990 levels by 2008, 
whereas the United States (US) pushed for targets that reduced emissions by 30 percent 
only from their projected levels for 2010 (Grubb et al. 1999:86, International Institute 
for Sustainable Development 1997:5).   
 
While the final Kyoto target was significantly below that pushed by CAN15, the 
negotiation of the numerical target by states was a direct result of the success of social 
movements in defining the legitimacy of the Protocol in terms of numerical emissions 
reduction commitments. The popular focus on targets and distribution was evidenced by 
                                                 
15 And well below levels required to stabilise atmospheric greenhouse gas emissions. Soon after Kyoto it 
was estimated that thirty additional Kyoto’s would be required to meet the objective of the UNFCCC 
(Malakoff 1997:2048).  
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the media response following the signing of the Protocol. For example, the leading story 
in The New York Times following the Kyoto deal ran the headline figure of 5.2 percent, 
but continually highlighted the absence of developing country targets (Stevens 1997:1). 
The latter point was an articulation of the Byrd-Hagel Resolution (1997) that passed the 
US Senate in the months prior to the negotiation, resolving that the US would not 
become Party to a Protocol that did not restrict developing country emissions. This 
point justified the subsequent non-ratification of the Kyoto Protocol by the US, and its 
popular coverage demonstrates the role of the US state in shaping its own legitimacy 
function.  
 
The other side of the Kyoto target, at one-quarter of that pursued by CAN, is that states 
fulfilled their accumulation function by securing the climate system as a carbon sink for 
capital at near pre-Kyoto levels. Nonetheless, if enforced, the 5.2 percent reduction 
target had the potential to represent a barrier to capital as a socially prescribed limit on 
capital’s  use  of  the  climate  system  as  a  carbon  sink.  In  this  sense,  by  framing public 
debates around targets, environmental groups successfully equated social perceptions of 
climate change - to which states are most likely to respond - with the need to restrict the 
flexibility of capital through an international political agreement between states. 
However, the concept of absolute social barriers runs contrary to the expansionary logic 
of capital. In relation to the first contradiction of capitalism, Marx (1973:334) wrote that 
“capital  is  the  endless  and  limitless  drive  to  go  beyond  its  limiting  barrier.  Every 
boundary is and has to be a barrier for it...and beyond which it constantly seeks to go”. 
Because the Kyoto targets were potential social barriers rooted in the second 
contradiction  of  capitalism,  capital  required  support  from  states  to  overcome Kyoto’s 
limiting barrier. This support was provided in the form of the CDM. 
 
The original form of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) actually had the 
potential to support the Kyoto Protocol as a social barrier. Initially, the Brazilian state 
proposed  a  ‘Clean  Development  Fund’  (Lohmann  2006:51),  which  was  premised  on 
principles of compliance and compensation. It would levy financial penalties on 
developed countries for not meeting their reduction commitments. Penalties would be 
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placed in the Fund with the purpose of financing climate change mitigation and 
adaptation projects in developing countries, out of recognition of differing historical 
responsibilities for global warming (Oberthür and Ott 1999:167). The Clean 
Development Fund would therefore have strengthened Kyoto as a social barrier because 
it enforced costs for non-compliance to the Kyoto targets. However, while the proposal 
was supported by the Group of 77 developing countries and the Chinese state, it was 
opposed by the United States. Instead, the United States proposed a modified version in 
which  a  ‘command  and  control’-like fund was transformed into a market-based 
mechanism (Grubb et al. 1999:102-3). Hence, a Clean Development Mechanism was 
defined in Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, allowing the production  of  ‘Certified 
Emission Reductions’  (CERs)  in  ‘project  activities’  in  developing  countries,  which 
could be used by developed countries to meet their reduction targets.  
 
The proposal and negotiation of the CDM occurred in the context of contestation 
between and within coalitions of states, capital and social movements. Coalitions of 
capital representing industries that are heavily reliant on fossil fuels, such as the Global 
Climate Coalition, were active throughout the negotiations. They lobbied against any 
strict compliance measures, such as the Clean Development Fund, which they perceived 
as a threat to their profitability, instead stressing the need for ‘flexibility’ (Levy & Egan 
1998:346). Other coalitions of capital, such as the Business Council for Sustainable 
Energy, were advocating flexibility mechanisms as an opportunity for profitable 
business activities, such as for finance capital in emissions trading, and the export of 
technology by renewable energy capital (Vormedal 2008:43). 
 
Conversely, the official position of CAN was to oppose the inclusion of flexibility 
mechanisms (Betsill 2002:53). In contrast to the framing of such mechanisms in terms 
of  ‘opportunity’  or  ‘efficiency’ by capital, environmental groups such as Greenpeace 
framed them as “loopholes” to domestic action by developed states (Hare 1999:2). The 
notable exception in CAN was the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), one of the 
designers of the United States sulphur dioxide trading scheme (Gulbrandsen & 
Andresen  2004:65).  EDF’s  pro-market ideological position afforded them greater 
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political power than other CAN groups such as Greenpeace. Whereas EDF worked 
closely with both the United Nations and United States at Kyoto, other environmental 
groups like Greenpeace have been locked out of informal meetings at climate 
negotiations where concrete proposals are agreed upon (Newell 2000:132,136). One of 
the problems faced by environmental groups opposing the CDM during its development 
was the difficulty in appealing to public legitimacy over the technical means of 
achieving greenhouse gas emissions. This difficulty was compounded by the perceived 
success of the United States sulphur dioxide trading scheme, which provided legitimacy 
for market mechanisms (Lohmann 2006:71). Hence, United States negotiators were 
successful in turning an idea based on principles of compensation and compliance to 
one based on investment and flexibility for non-compliance. In embodying these 
principles, the CDM provided a means for capital to overcome the potential social 
barriers of the Kyoto targets. 
 
Capital accumulation through crisis  
 
The CDM fulfils the state’s accumulation function on two fronts. Firstly, the CDM 
defends the profits of fossil fuel-intensive capital operating in developed countries by 
making the Kyoto targets a voluntary proposition. The CDM allows states and capitals 
in developed countries to avoid curtailing carbon pollution from domestic operations by 
purchasing carbon credits, known as Certified Emission Reductions (CERs), from 
project activities in developing countries. In fact, the Kyoto Protocol does not mandate 
any domestic emissions reductions because neither the Kyoto Protocol, nor any 
subsequent United Nations decisions, places a quantitative limit on the use of CERs in 
meeting emissions reduction targets16. Therefore, states instituted a mechanism through 
which they could fulfil their accumulation function by continuing to provide capital 
with the climate system as a condition of production in the form of a carbon sink. In 
                                                 
16 Vague qualitative language is used instead. The Kyoto Protocol states the CDM will contribute to 
“part” of developed countries emissions reduction requirements (UNFCCC 1997:11). The Marrakech 
Accords clarified this to mean “supplemental” to domestic actions (UNFCCC 2001:51).  
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doing so, states responded directly to the flexibility demands of coalitions of capital like 
the Global Climate Coalition by developing a mechanism to overcome the potential 
barriers they were facing.  
 
Secondly, the CDM is more than a passive state response to the demands of capital. It is 
the product of dynamic states that actively created CERs as a new form of ‘commodity’ 
production and trade. The CDM is a state-led instrument for capital to accumulate 
through social barriers to production. This is because the CDM uses the Kyoto targets, 
which were potential social barriers from an emerging second contradiction crisis, as the 
driving force in the production of CERs. Therefore, the demands of social movements 
themselves were transformed from potential restrictions to capital, to providing the 
impetus for a new form of capital accumulation and a more dynamic capitalism.  
 
The CDM market has two distinct sides: the project phase and the trading phase. The 
project phase, which produces CERs, is explicitly concerned with the promotion of 
capital accumulation, based on the principle of ‘additionality’.  Additionality is defined 
in general terms in the Kyoto Protocol as the requirement that the emissions reductions 
from a CDM project are  “additional  to  any  that  would  occur  in  the  absence  of  the 
certified project activity” (UNFCCC 1997:12). This is ostensibly a safeguard to ensure 
that  emissions  reductions  are  “real, measurable,  and  long-term”  (UNFCCC 1997:12). 
However, in practice, the principle is used to ensure profitability. In order for a project 
to be certified as additional, it needs to prove that it requires revenue from the sale of 
CERs to ensure profitability in absolute terms, or to be relatively more profitable than 
other more polluting options, such as coal-fired power plants (Michaelowa 2010:252). 
Therefore, the underlying principle of the CDM seeks to promote the expanded 
reproduction of capital that would not have occurred without CDM revenue. The 
revenue from the sale of CERs can then be reinvested by project developers to augment 
further capital accumulation. For example, it was reported that the revenue gained by 
Gujarat Flourochemicals for selling CERs produced in their industrial gas destruction 
CDM project was invested in a new (and polluting) caustic soda and Teflon factory 
(Ghouri 2009).  
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The second phase of the CDM market concerns the trading of CERs. The sale of CERs 
in  ‘primary’  markets  direct  from  project  developers,  or  the  trading  of  CERs  in 
‘secondary’  markets,  is  essential  for  the  realisation  of  revenue  from  CERs.  It  also 
provides opportunities for finance capital, such as large investment banks, which have 
actively invested in CDM projects, to profit from trading CERs on financial markets. 
This  process  is  underpinned  by  a  second  fundamental  principle:  ‘equivalence’.  The 
principle of equivalence uses Global Warming Potentials (GWP) to measure potency of 
different types of greenhouse gases in comparison to carbon dioxide (UNFCCC 
1997:6). This measure provides CDM projects with an accounting logic, and a means of 
comparing a diverse range of projects and greenhouse gases, as a homogenous CER 
commodity. CERs represent one tonne of carbon dioxide-equivalent, which allows them 
to be integrated with other carbon trading schemes (Newell & Paterson 2010:86). For 
example, equivalence allows a methane avoidance CDM project in Brazil to produce 
CERs that can be traded to offset carbon dioxide emissions from a coal-fired power 
station in England. Those CERs can then be used in compliance with emissions targets 
under the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme.  
 
Spatial restructuring of the climate system 
 
Underpinning the production of CERs in the CDM is a spatial restructuring of the 
climate system as a productive force, and the social relations of its reproduction. In 
relation to the former, the CDM uses global space to restructure the climate system 
through the production and trade of carbon sinks in commodity from. The intellectual 
source of the CDM as a market instrument is orthodox environmental economics and its 
neo-classical underpinnings. But the free-market ideological foundations of the CDM 
are in stark contradiction with the social relations of reproduction that facilitate the 
spatial restructuring of the climate system. This is because states not only instituted the 
CDM, but constitute the functioning of the entire CDM market in cooperation with 
capital.    
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In response to the natural and social barriers that surround second contradictions, states 
and  capital  often  restructure  production  conditions  as  productive  forces  (O’Connor 
1998:167). The CDM restructures the climate system as a productive force by 
instituting the production and trade of representations of instances of carbon sink 
capacity.  CERs  are  produced  through  the  ‘as  if’  or  technological  reduction  of 
greenhouse gas emissions. ‘As if’ projects, such as renewable energy projects, represent 
the highest number of total projects. They produce CERs because they purport to emit a 
lesser quantity of greenhouse gases than would otherwise be emitted without the CDM. 
For example, a wind farm project will produce CERs if project developers are able to 
demonstrate that in the absence of CER revenue, a more greenhouse gas-intensive 
natural gas station would instead be providing the power. The CERs from this form of 
project are therefore an ‘as if’ removal of greenhouse gases from an alternative scenario. 
Technological project types do remove real greenhouse gases, mostly through the 
destruction of industrial greenhouse gases using incineration technologies. This form of 
project type has produced the majority of total CERs. The use values of CERs in 
offsetting emissions and meeting emissions reduction requirements alters CERs from 
representations  of  ‘emission reductions’, to representations of a particular instance of 
‘carbon sink’ capacity. This is because CERs are used by states and capital as additional 
carbon sink capacity for their real greenhouse gas emissions that exceed socially 
imposed limits, such as from the Kyoto targets or the European Union Emissions 
Trading Scheme. 
 
If the demands of social movements provided the impetus for states to develop the 
CDM as a path of capital accumulation, the social restructuring of global space is used 
for its execution. The circuit of production, exchange, and use of CERs operates 
through the socially constructed division between developing and developed countries 
at the level of global environmental politics. It is used in order to construct an external 
space in developing countries where carbon sink capacity can be produced and an 
internal space in developed countries where carbon sink capacity can be consumed. 
This is a social restructuring of the climate system as a productive force because natural 
processes of carbon cycling do not adhere to the CDM’s internal-external restructuring. 
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Indeed, the basis for it lies not in an appreciation of natural systems, but rather in the 
neo-classical economic notion of ‘substitutability’ of resources through the price system 
and technological advance (Simon 1981:38-9, 221-2). 
 
There are three main ways such substitutability is envisaged by neo-classical 
economics. Firstly, through developments which increase efficiency in the usage of 
natural resources. Secondly, through the substitution of natural resources with 
technological alternatives. Thirdly, in the use of technology in increasing available 
resources through new discoveries or assisting access to known resources (Hamilton 
1997:49). Each of these rationales is used in the CDM. ‘As if’ CDM projects are based 
on increasing the fossil fuel efficiency of a particular commodity, such as electricity, 
through the use of ‘supercritical’ rather than ‘subcritical’ technology in coal-fired power 
stations. Technological CDM projects, most commonly industrial gas destruction, are 
premised on a concrete substitution of natural sinks which absorb and cycle carbon in 
the climate system, with technologies  that destroy greenhouse gases,  such as  ‘thermal 
oxidation’  technology.  Both  of these forms of substitution, when represented in 
commodity form as CERs, are then used in the third way, by increasing the social 
availability of carbon sinks as a condition of production for states and capital in 
developed countries.  
 
The social structure of markets 
 
The design of the CDM as a market instrument is underpinned by environmental 
economics and its neo-classical economic foundations. The Kyoto targets incompletely 
change the climate system’s carbon sink capacity from a public good to a private good, 
by partially restricting the quantity of its allowable use.  The rationale behind such 
instruments is that carbon pollution can be optimally allocated through the price 
mechanism to its highest exchange value uses (Hamilton 1997:49, Pearce 1976:103). 
The corollary of this principle is that the price mechanism efficiently allocates 
responsibility for reducing pollution to its lowest exchange value uses. This is the basis 
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of the rationale of the CDM, because carbon reduction projects are understood to have a 
lower marginal cost in developing countries than in developed ones (Markandya 
1994:53-4). To this end, while science was a powerful social force in impelling social 
movements to demand the protection of the climate, the idea of least cost emissions 
reductions has been assisted by the scientific community. Demeritt (2001:316) has 
argued  that  the  use  of  “physically  reductionist”  climate  modelling  means  climate 
scientists have tended to frame climate change as a problem of the “physical properties” 
of greenhouse gases, abstracted from their social context. Such framing supports the 
rationale behind the CDM because if the problem of global warming is simply too many 
physical particles in the atmosphere, the place of their reduction is immaterial in a 
global-scale problem like climate change17.  
 
The Kyoto targets, and subsequently the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme, 
are indicative of the contemporary environmental economics understanding of global 
warming  as  a problem of  an  “incomplete  allocation of property  rights”  in  the climate 
system as a public good (Hamilton 1997:41). In accordance with the neo-classical 
tradition, the assigning of a certain quota of property rights by states that are tradable by 
private actors in markets is an appropriate role for state authorities (Pearce et al. 
1989:165). States were dynamic in not only affording capital the possibility of trading a 
socially imposed limit on property rights, but also the ability to produce additional 
property rights in the CER commodity form. However, in practice, the role of states in 
the CDM market goes far beyond that which is suggested in orthodox environmental 
economics. Rather, the entire functioning of the CDM market is constituted by a state-
based social structure. 
 
The role of states in underpinning the CDM reflects the second dimension to the 
restructuring of production conditions. In conjunction with restructuring production 
conditions as productive forces, O’Connor (1998:168) identifies the need to restructure 
the “social  relations  of  [their]  reproduction”.  Such  restructuring  has  the  “aim  of 
                                                 
17 The spatial and temporal consequences of this social abstraction are discussed further in the following 
two chapters. 
35 
 
exercising...more  planning”  over  production  conditions,  and  requires  “new  forms  of 
cooperation”  between states  and  capital  (O’Connor  1998:167-8). The academic 
literature regularly praises the CDM for its embrace of private self-interest in driving 
‘clean development’ through  ‘public-private  partnerships’  (e.g.  Streck  2004:313). 
However, the partnership is a very unequal one in that the profits made by individual 
capitals involved in the CDM are driven and therefore effectively subsidised by states. 
This support is evident in both the project and trading stages of the CDM market.  
 
Every moment of the CDM project stage is constituted by states18. CDM projects must 
be  registered  by  the  CDM  ‘Executive  Board’,  comprised  of  10  representatives  of 
national states. Prior to registration, cooperation between businesses is required, but the 
cooperation is entirely determined by states. Firstly, ‘project developers’, which are the 
investors, owners, and managers of prospective CDM projects, hire a private consultant 
to  prepare  a  ‘Project  Design  Document’  (PDD).  The  purpose  of  the  PDD  is  to 
demonstrate that the project corresponds with the extensive and technical CDM 
regulations and methodologies. These rules were developed by states at international 
climate negotiations, particularly the Marrakech Conference in 2001, as well as the 
Executive Board and the Methodologies Panel. Projects also must be validated by one 
of thirty-four  private  consultancies,  known  as  a  ‘Designated  Operational  Entities’ 
(DOE) that have been accredited by the Executive Board (UNFCCC 2010b). Prior to 
registration by the Executive Board, CDM projects require approval by both the ‘host’ 
government from the developing country in which the CDM is taking place, and a 
developed country government ‘sponsor’. Once registered, a different Executive Board 
accredited  DOE  is  required  to  monitor  and  verify  ‘emissions  reductions’  in  CDM 
projects. But as a non-material commodity, CERs can only be ‘issued’ by the Executive 
Board.  
 
Host country governments, particularly the Chinese government, utilise their approval 
role as a  means  to  channel  CDM  finance  into  “priority  sectors”  of  the  economy 
(Schroeder 2009:372). The pattern of CDM investment - heavily skewed towards the 
                                                 
18 Stages of the CDM project cycle are sourced from CDM Watch’s (2010a:8-14) CDM Toolkit.  
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large developing countries of China, India, and Brazil - also suggests that sponsoring 
governments use the CDM to support existing strategic trade and investment patterns. 
The experience of Gujarat Fluorochemicals Ltd (GFL), the project developer for the 
first CDM project, demonstrates the effectiveness of state support in underpinning the 
profits of capital in developing countries. GFL increased its net profit by 41 percent in 
its first year of CDM trade by selling 3.9 billion Indian rupees (approx. AU$90.6 
million) worth of CERs. This represented 67 percent of  the  company’s total sales 
revenue, more than supplementing its production of refrigerant gases and demonstrating 
the effective integration between CER and other commodity production (GFL 
2007:27,40,52).  
 
States have also supported the participation of capital based in developed countries in 
both the CDM project phase and the CER trading phase. One of the most prolific 
private businesses involved in the CDM is Ecosecurities, owned by JP Morgan Chase. It 
is the company that has prepared the most PDDs as a consultant, and has purchased the 
most CERs direct from projects (UNEP 2010b). The role of Ecosecurities, a company 
without greenhouse gas reduction requirements, which therefore does not require CERs 
in its own right, indicates the potential for companies in trading CERs on financial 
markets. But this stage of the CDM market is also coordinated by states through the 
UNFCCC’s  ‘International  Transaction  Log’  (ITL).  The  ITL  records  all  CER 
transactions between project developers, carbon funds, and states in order to monitor 
their use in accordance with Kyoto rules (Bumpus & Liverman 2008:140). Finally, as 
was argued above, the CDM is a means to accumulate through the Kyoto targets, which 
provide a use value and demand for CERs. Since Kyoto, the actions of national states 
within the European Union (EU) have driven most CER demand. In 2004 EU states 
agreed to a ‘Linking Directive’ where CERs from the CDM could be surrendered under 
the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (Newell & Paterson 2010:104). This decision has 
proved to be the lifeblood of the CDM, underscoring 90 percent of global demand for 
CERs (Capoor & Ambrosi 2008:23).  
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Conclusion: The CDM as a spatial fix 
 
The elaborate state structures that support the CDM market facilitate the operation of 
the CDM as a spatial fix to the emerging climate change crisis. Indeed, the history of 
capitalism has been characterised by the constant seeking of spatial fixes to its internal 
contradictions. Notably, this has occurred in response to the first contradiction of 
capitalism, where spatial fixes to demand-side crises have been pursued by expansion 
into hitherto external markets as an outlet for surplus capital (Harvey 2001:369). The 
CDM is undoubtedly related to the first contradiction, by providing investment 
opportunities for businesses such as Ecosecurities to invest in new markets, both in 
terms of territory and commodity forms. But primarily, the CDM follows this logic as a 
spatial fix to the supply-side crisis of climate change as a second contradiction of 
capitalism. This chapter has argued that the CDM uses global space to restructure the 
global climate system  in  order  to  overcome  social  barriers  to  capital’s  use  of  natural 
carbon sinks in developed countries. It also promotes capital accumulation for 
participants in the CDM market in both developed and developing countries.  Spatial 
fixes to a first contradiction of capitalism are designed to temporarily resolve a crisis in 
the internal region by shifting the crisis to the external (Harvey 1982:427). Similarly, as 
a spatial fix to a second contradiction of capitalism, the CDM displaces through space 
the political, economic, and ecological crises that are developing around climate change 
to the CDM project level. The following chapter takes up the question of displacement 
in terms of its consequences for the local communities and ecosystems that surround 
CDM project sites.  
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Chapter three 
Displacement through space and the partial 
capitalisation of nature 
 
 
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), as argued in the previous chapter, is a 
state-instituted spatial fix which promotes capital accumulation by displacing responses 
to climate change to CDM projects in developing countries. However, environmental 
and other social movements have documented significant negative impacts of CDM 
projects on local communities and ecosystems. This chapter analyses these impacts by 
continuing the incorporation of a spatial dimension into the dynamic of the second 
contradiction. The chapter argues that in displacing the climate crisis through space to 
the level of CDM projects, those projects have created new site-specific crises for local 
communities and ecosystems surrounding projects. This is due to the specific form of 
capital-nature relations underpinning the accumulation imperatives of the CDM: the 
partial  ‘capitalisation  of  nature’  (M.  O’Connor  1993,  1989).  The  CDM’s  partial 
capitalisation of nature restructures local space around CDM projects, resulting in a dual 
character whereby the capitalisation of carbon sinks depends on the appropriation of 
uncapitalised nature. The negative impacts on local communities and ecosystems 
surrounding CDM projects are a direct result of this relationship. The tension between 
capitalisation and appropriation, and the role of ‘sustainable development’ discourse in 
facilitating and legitimising the process, is illustrated by a case study of India’s 
extensive CDM project market. 
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The partial capitalisation of carbon sinks  
 
The CDM socially restructures the climate system as a productive force through a 
spatial division between developed and developing countries. The previous chapter 
demonstrated that states use this division to displace responses to climate change to the 
level of CDM projects in developing countries. These projects produce representations 
of carbon sink capacity that can be filled by the carbon emissions of capital in 
developed countries. This process is embedded in a particular set of capital-climate 
system relations based on the ‘capitalisation of nature’. Capitalised nature is defined by 
Martin O’Connor (1993:8,  italics  in original) as “the  representation of the biophysical 
milieu  (nature)...as  reservoirs  of  ‘capital’  and  the  commodification  of  these  stocks  as 
property  tradeable  ‘in  the  marketplace’  ”.  This  is  the  essence  of  Certified  Emission 
Reductions (CERs), which are commodified representations of a specific capacity of the 
climate system to act as a carbon sink for one tonne of carbon dioxide-equivalent. The 
capitalisation of nature represents a change in the capital-nature relationship because 
nature is internalised as capital, rather than the traditional notion of capital acting on 
external  nature  (M.  O’Connor  1989:35).  Correspondingly,  capital  accumulation 
becomes equated with the management of nature, because the reproduction of capital is 
also the reproduction of nature (M. O’Connor 1993:18). 
 
The traditional notion of capital acting on external nature was described by Marx 
(1971:745) as  “the  free  gift  of  Nature  to  capital”.  The  use  values  of  nature,  as  a 
condition of production, are produced through ecological processes rather than wage 
labour19,  and  are  therefore  “freely  appropriated”  by  capital20 (Burkett 1999:94). The 
account of climate change developed in Chapter one reflects this relationship. The use 
                                                 
19 The utilisation of the use values of natural conditions often does require wage labour. For example, the 
utilisation of heat from coal requires a furnace, which is the product of wage labour. But the productive 
force itself is the product of ecological processes (Burkett 1999:94).  
20 Burkett (1999) stresses that ‘free appropriation’ refers to capitalism’s reduction of value to abstract 
labour time. Because natural conditions are not produced by labour as commodities, they ‘cost nothing’ to 
capital. 
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values of fossil fuels, land, and the climate system as a carbon sink have been freely 
appropriated by capital, which in turn has impaired the use value of the climate system 
as a climatic tap. Specifically, the use value of the climate system as a carbon sink has 
been freely appropriated because greenhouse gas emissions are absorbed and cycled by 
(second-) natural processes between the (second-) natural components of the climate 
system.  
 
The CDM alters this from a relationship of free appropriation to the capitalisation of 
carbon sinks. To be sure, the Kyoto Protocol largely codified the continued free 
appropriation of natural carbon sinks by capital operating in developed countries. 
However, the carbon sink capacity that is required by capital but restricted in terms of 
free appropriation by the Kyoto or other targets can instead be capitalised through the 
CDM. This process of capitalisation is essential in allowing capital to overcome the 
potential social barriers represented by emission reduction requirements. The process of 
capitalisation also underpins the accumulation imperatives inherent in the production of 
CERs. The capitalisation of carbon sinks through the production of CERs marks a 
significant break with  capital’s  relationship with  the climate  system as  a  condition of 
production. Unlike natural carbon sinks which are produced outside the circuit of capital 
and freely appropriated, CERs as representations of carbon sinks are produced inside a 
circuit of capital in commodity form, principally by technological means21.  
 
At an abstract level, Martin O’Connor (1993:17) extends the process of capitalisation to 
its logical  conclusion  of  a  “global  system  of  capitalised  nature”  in  which  all  natural 
materials and processes are capitalised. However, the CDM does not represent a 
complete system, but rather a partial capitalisation of nature. It is partial because 
carbon sinks are capitalised in abstraction from both the natural carbon cycle, which 
remains largely uncapitalised, and from the ecosystems and societies which are 
inextricably interdependent with the component parts of the climate system.  
                                                 
21 However, it will be argued in the following chapter that this is a transformation at the ideational level 
only, in order to facilitate continued appropriation of the natural climate system as a carbon sink.   
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The socially constructed spatial division between developed and developing countries is 
an abstraction from the global carbon cycle described in Chapter one, but is necessary 
for the proper functioning of the CDM market. Like all use values, space is a material 
characteristic of the natural climate system as a carbon sink (Harvey 1982:375). 
Greenhouse gas emissions are absorbed and cycled through a set of concrete processes 
by the component parts of the climate system which function in particular spaces. 
However, the businesses that ultimately surrender CERs to offset carbon emissions by 
definition emit greenhouse gases in a different geographical location to the carbon sinks 
capitalised in CDM projects. Therefore, like all forms of exchange, the sale and trade of 
CERs requires a means of “spatial integration” between project developers, traders, and 
final purchasers (Harvey 1982:375). The principle of equivalence achieves this 
integration by homogenising different types of greenhouse gases, irrespective of the 
social relations that led to their emission or reduction, according only to their Global 
Warming Potential22 (GWP). Partial capitalisation through abstraction from the natural 
carbon cycle is therefore necessary to overcome the spatial constraints of the climate 
system. It also permits capitalisation to take place on the basis of expected realisation of 
profits from the exchange of CERs, rather than environmental integrity. 
 
Capitalisation occurs through the ‘as  if’ or  technological  removal of greenhouse gases 
on a project-by-project basis, independent of the component parts of the climate system. 
However, the component parts of the climate system are completely interrelated with 
ecosystems and societies, because they possess a myriad of potential use values as 
natural conditions of production and life, in addition to their roles in the climate system. 
For example, oceans are a natural condition for the fishing industry, the atmosphere 
provides oxygen, and land has spiritual significance for communities. Trees, soil, rivers 
and fish, which all have roles in the carbon cycle, also form interdependent parts of 
ecosystems. Therefore, in abstracting from the climate system as a whole, CERs 
                                                 
22 The use of GWPs is itself a deeply unequal measure, because the capacity of the climate system to act 
as a carbon sink depends on present concentrations of carbon, which means that GWP is biased towards 
historical emitters, and biased against those which have contributed little (Demeritt 2001:316-7).  
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abstract from the ecosystems and communities in which the component parts of the 
climate system are embedded.  
 
Capitalisation and appropriation: The dual character of the CDM 
 
While homogenous CER commodities are abstracted from all social and environmental 
contexts, and exchanged in the relative space of financial markets, their production 
occurs in real geographical space. Harvey (2003:176) argues  that  there  is  a  “dual 
character”  to  capital  accumulation between “expanded  reproduction and  accumulation 
by dispossession23 [which] are organically  linked, dialectically  intertwined”. A similar 
dual character has emerged in the geographical space around CDM projects, in which 
the internalisation of carbon sinks as capital depends on the appropriation of nature. The 
manifestation of this tension between capitalisation and appropriation represents the 
CDM’s restructuring of local24, as well as global space. This dual character is 
structurally defined in the CDM’s partial capitalisation of nature, and has ensured that 
in displacing the climate crisis through space to the level of CDM projects, those 
projects have created new site specific crises with devastating impacts on local 
communities and ecosystems.  
 
The size and nature of CDM projects is such that they necessarily require land, 
ecosystem sinks, and raw materials around CDM projects. However, like all natural 
conditions, the ecological materials and processes necessarily appropriated by CDM 
projects have alternative use values as conditions of livelihood and life. The 
                                                 
23 Harvey’s notion of ‘accumulation by dispossession’ is a reworking of Marx’s notion of ‘primitive’ or 
‘original’ accumulation, and Rosa Luxemburg’s study of the links between the colonisation of non-
capitalist societies and ‘underconsumption’ crises in capitalist societies. It describes a range of processes, 
including commodification and privatisation, which forcibly redistribute resources held in common to 
capital as a means to overcome crises of overproduction (Harvey 2003:137-182).  
24 ‘Local’ refers to the geographical and ecological spaces directly affected by CDM projects, but which 
both shape and are shaped by regional, national, and international dynamics, such as UN CDM rules. 
43 
 
appropriation of these conditions has therefore resulted in significant negative impacts 
on the livelihoods, health, and social structures of local communities, and the state of 
the local ecosystems. The dynamics of these impacts are exemplified in the case study 
of Indian CDM projects.  
 
Case study: Indian CDM projects 
 
India was the first country to participate in the CDM and has the second largest number 
of registered CDM projects behind China, with 532 registered projects (UNFCCC 
2010c). Indian CDM projects have received over 79 million CERs, also second behind 
China (UNFCCC 2010d). By 2012, India is projected to have produced 486 million 
CERs from over 965 projects (UNEP 2010a, 2010b). The four project types examined 
in the greatest depth by the case study - energy efficiency, industrial gas destruction, 
renewable energy, and waste-to-energy - are among the most common in terms of both 
total project numbers and total CERs issued. The exception is the HFC-23 industrial gas 
destruction project, which is a project type that represents only 0.4 percent of total 
CDM projects but has been issued with 51 percent of total CERs (UNEP 2010b). In 
addition to its large quantity of representative CDM projects, India is a useful case study 
because its projects have been subject to the greatest level of civil society scrutiny.  
 
Evidence from Indian coal power and industrial gas destruction projects demonstrates 
that the internalisation of carbon sinks as capital necessarily relies on the appropriation 
of land and ecosystem services. The specific local contexts of this appropriation have 
resulted in serious negative impacts including dispossession of land, loss of livelihoods, 
pollution of local ecosystems, and damage to human health. These impacts are 
manifestations of the dual character of the CDM, which is structurally defined in the 
partial capitalisation of nature.  
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The appropriation of land 
The dual character of CDM projects between capitalisation and appropriation has been 
most pronounced with the issue of land. Land is “the space required as an element of all 
production and all human activity” (Marx 1971:774). Here Marx appreciates that land 
has multiple use values as a condition of production and the basis for other activities not 
necessarily part of the capitalist production process, such as shelter. As a result there is 
great potential for conflict over access to land for different uses. The nature and scale of 
many CDM projects intensifies this potential because the capitalisation of carbon sinks, 
in conjunction with other commodity producing activities, requires the appropriation of 
large areas of land to the exclusion of all other uses. The dispossession of communities 
that can result from such appropriation is evidenced with the case of the Sasan 
‘supercritical’  coal  project  in  Madhya  Pradesh,  India. The project entailed the 
appropriation of a total of 946 hectares of land, which resulted in the dispossession of 
some of India’s most vulnerable communities from state land.    
 
The particular ways that CDM projects dispossess communities from land are always 
site specific and historically contingent. In the case of the Sasan coal project, the 
dispossession of the already disadvantaged Scheduled Caste (lower caste/dalit) and 
Scheduled Tribe (indigenous) communities was due to a history of displacement in the 
region, and the role of the state authorities in facilitating the appropriation of state land. 
30 percent of the land appropriated for the project was state land that was lived on and 
cultivated for agriculture by Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe communities. Many 
people had been displaced onto the land from the recent construction of the National 
Thermal Power Corporation power plant. Others had been similarly displaced 15 years 
earlier by the Rihand Dam. Some had been granted access to state land in 1960 in 
recognition of social disadvantage (Nandi et al. 2009:44). These were the historical 
circumstances that led to 1,283 families from three villages (Siddikala, Siddhi Kurd and 
Harhara) being displaced from government land. The state had a significant role in this 
appropriation and dispossession. The construction of the project was awarded to 
Reliance Power as part of a Government of India tenure process. The District Magistrate 
spearheaded the task by giving notices to the communities to vacate state land, while the 
State Forest Department cancelled the historical access they had granted on the basis 
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that community cultivation was “encroachment”  (Nandi et al. 2009:41,43). Hence, the 
appropriation and dispossession of land was a state-sanctioned process.  
 
Similar forms of dispossession have been replicated throughout CDM projects. The 
MSPL Limited wind power project in Karnataka, India, appropriated a total of 96 
hectares of state forest and village land, erecting fences which locked communities out 
of land that was previously used for cattle grazing and the collection of firewood (Mate 
& Ghosh 2009a:32-3, Ghosh 2009:2). Likewise, the Plantar charcoal production project 
in Minas Gerias, Brazil, appropriated 23,000 hectares of land for its monoculture 
eucalyptus plantation. The project has dispossessed indigenous and peasant 
communities from previously productive land, while drying up and polluting local water 
supplies (Lohmann 2006:204). The particularities of each case are site specific, but 
dispossession  from  land  is  directly  linked  to  the  CDM’s  structurally defined partial 
capitalisation of nature. This is because the capitalisation of carbon sinks in power 
stations, wind farms, or tree plantations necessarily requires the appropriation of large 
areas of uncapitalised land to the exclusion of all other uses. 
 
The appropriation of ecosystem services 
In addition to the appropriation of land, the CDM’s dual character is also evident in the 
appropriation of ecosystem services. The nature of many CDM projects is such that the 
capitalisation of carbon sinks requires the appropriation of ecosystem services as sinks 
for waste products. This has resulted in some very damaging impacts to the functioning 
of ecosystems that surround CDM projects. In turn, ecological damage has caused some 
significant negative impacts on local communities because, like land, ecosystem 
services have multiple use values, such as supporting agricultural livelihoods and 
human health. The Gujarat Flourochemicals Ltd (GFL) HFC-23 destruction plant in 
Gujarat, India, the first of all CDM projects to be approved under the Kyoto Protocol in 
2005, illustrates both the necessity of appropriating ecosystem services and its negative 
effects on ecosystems and dependent communities.  
 
46 
 
The project capitalises carbon sinks on the basis that it destroys the potent greenhouse 
gas HFC-23, which is a by-product of the production of a refrigerant gas. The project 
installed the necessary technology on the existing GFL site and therefore did not 
exclusively appropriate any new land (GFL 2005:9). However, the process of ‘thermal 
oxidation’ which destroys HFC-23, results in the release of pollutants toxic to humans, 
animals, and ecosystems, including carbon monoxide, sulphur dioxide, nitrous oxide, 
and other dioxins (GFL 2005:9). Secondly, the process of HFC-23 destruction requires 
large quantities of water for cooling and neutralisation purposes, which is subsequently 
recycled or discharged as effluent (GFL 2005:9,56). Thirdly, the process also requires 
fossil fuel-based energy to generate temperatures necessary for gas incineration (GFL 
2005:9). The project therefore necessarily appropriates and impairs natural conditions of 
production including water and fossil fuels as input taps, and ecosystem services as 
waste output sinks, in order to capitalise carbon sinks. 
 
Four villages (Nathkuva, Jitpura, Kankodakoi, and Ranjitnagar) with populations of 
approximately 1,200 people are within a two kilometre radius of the GFL project 
(Dabhi 2009:141). These communities have reported significant air and ground water 
pollution, which has impacted agricultural productivity and human health in the poor 
and rural area (Ghouri 2009). White films on the water and white crusts on the soil can 
be observed in the vicinity of the project. Laboratory testing of this soil and water has 
found dangerously high levels of fluoride, chloride and other contaminants that are 
consistent  with  the  project’s  HFC-23 destruction operations (Ghouri 2009). Local 
villagers have complained of significant impacts on human health, including clusters of 
birth deformities, and endemic skin and joint ailments. They also claim that crop and 
fruit productivity has significantly declined, and village cattle have reduced milk 
production and have developed health problems such as tumours (Dabhi 2009:142).  
 
The impacts of CDM projects also need to be understood in conjunction with the 
primary commodities produced. The destruction of HFC-23 is possible because it is a 
by-product of HCFC-22, a refrigerant gas which is the primary commodity produced by 
GFL. The production of HCFC-22 is also a highly polluting operation, which the local 
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community has fought since 1996, including in an unsuccessful case to the Gujarat High 
Court (Dabhi 2009:143). Therefore, it is not only the CDM project activity that requires 
the appropriation of ecosystem services, but also the primary form of commodity 
production. The two cannot be separated from the CDM because the destruction of 
HFC-23 waste gas depends on the production of HCFC-22, and the revenue from the 
sale of CERs supports the production of HCFC-22, thereby exacerbating existing social 
tensions between the community and the project developer.  
 
Reliance on waste from otherwise polluting industries is an endemic feature of the 
CDM. For example, the Agrosuper project in Region IV, Chile, claims CDM credits 
from the capture and combustion of methane from pig manure. However, the project 
relies  on  the  continuing  operation  of  the  factory’s  water- and fishmeal-intensive 
production in order for the generation of methane to capture and capitalise as carbon 
sinks (Alarcon 2009:75). The GFL and other projects illustrate another side of the 
restructuring of local space by the dual character of the CDM. The capitalisation of 
carbon sinks through HFC-23 destruction depends on the appropriation of ecosystem 
services outside the project’s boundaries. However, GFL’s natural conditions of 
production are also conditions of life itself. In displacing the climate crisis to the CDM 
project level, the GFL project has created new crises in the state of the local ecosystems, 
and in the local communities that rely on ecosystem services.  
 
The role of sustainable development  
 
The  CDM’s  partial  capitalisation  of  nature  immediately  discredits  any  purported 
equation between the accumulation of capital through the production of CERs, and the 
reproduction of nature  as  a whole.  The CDM’s  capitalisation  extends  only  to  carbon 
sinks, and therefore any equation is immediately limited to the reproduction of the 
climate system25. Instead, the structure of the CDM is formally designed to protect local 
                                                 
25 The impact of CERs on the climate system is analysed in the following chapter.  
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communities and uncapitalised ecosystems from any negative impacts of projects 
through  the  concept  of  ‘sustainable  development’.  Indeed,  sustainable  development  is 
given a high priority in the Kyoto Protocol, listed alongside the reduction of greenhouse 
gases as a ‘double goal’ of the CDM. However, evidence from Indian wind power and 
waste heat energy projects illustrates that in practice, the notion of sustainable 
development has facilitated the appropriation of nature and the resulting negative 
impacts. This is due to an application of the dominant understanding of sustainable 
development which - like the capitalisation of nature – conflates sustainability with 
economic growth (Paton 2008:95).  
 
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which 
embodies the Kyoto Protocol, is a product of the Rio Earth Summit in 1992. The 
application of sustainable development principles in Indian and other CDM projects has 
very much been a product of the sustainable development discourse developed in the 
Agenda 21 document adopted at the same conference. Earlier notions of sustainability, 
such  as  those  from  the  ‘steady-state’  and  ‘eco-development’  traditions,  stressed  the 
contradictions between economic growth and nature, and promoted ideas of ecological 
sustainability and social justice (Paton 2008:96-7). On the other hand, the Rio Summit 
“made  economic  growth  the  means for  achieving”  environmental  and  social  goals 
(Paton 2008:105, italics added).  This position was central to the development of the 
CDM at an international level, and has been faithfully adhered to in the approval 
process for individual CDM projects. Under the CDM, approval of sustainable 
development  is  the  domain  of  each  host  country’s  Designated  National Authority 
(DNA) (UNFCCC 2001:81).  India’s DNA, CDM India, which is within the Ministry of 
Environment and Forests, has four criteria for judging sustainable development: social; 
economic; technological; and environmental well-being (CDM India 2010). In practice, 
each indicator of sustainable development is understood to be achieved through the 
economic activity of CDM projects.  
 
Projects with serious negative impacts arising from the appropriation of nature use 
dominant sustainable development discourse to gain CDM approval. In particular, 
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project developers appeal to the general links between economic growth and societal 
progress that the CDM project will create. For example, the Tata Motors wind power 
project in Maharashtra, India, appealed to the  general  ‘trickle  down’  effects  of  the 
project in its Project Design Document. It states that the project assists sustainable 
development  by  “increasing  income  security  of  vulnerable  sections  of  the  society 
through redistribution benefits on account of the economic activities associated with the 
project” (Tata 2006:3). The appeal to poverty is significant in the context of Agenda 21. 
The document upheld that poverty alleviation through economic growth was conducive 
to sustainable development because poverty was one of the principle causes of 
environmental damage (Carruthers 2001:99-100). However, rather than some sort of 
general economic uplifting, the economic activity of the CDM project has had a specific 
negative impact on the poor local communities. In appropriating 900 hectares of village 
and government land, it has dispossessed a large Scheduled Caste community (Mate & 
Yasmin 2008:32-3).  
 
The project also promised to provide some specific social benefits in the form of 
employment for the local community (Tata 2006:3), but this is discouraged by the 
CDM’s structure of partially capitalised nature. Indeed, the promise of employment was 
a major factor in landowners agreeing to sell their land for below-market rates. 
However, while jobs were extended to a large number in the community during 
constructions, only five people have gained ongoing employment (Mate & Yasmin 
2008:33). Similarly, during construction of the Xiaoxi hydropower dam in Hunan, 
China, which displaced at least 7,563 people from water submersion, local business 
owners reported revenue booms from the large quantity of construction workers. 
However, because hydropower dams require little labour during operation, the rise in 
economic activity quickly subsided once construction was complete (Lea 2008:8-9). 
The non-enforcement of ‘sustainable development’ promises, such as employment, is a 
vestige of the partial capitalisation of nature in the design of the CDM.  Emissions 
reductions are continually monitored to calculate quantities of capitalisation, whereas 
sustainable development only needs to be signed off by the DNA in the design phase. 
Furthermore, employment during construction often coincides with the appropriation of 
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land and other negative impacts, and is therefore an effective means of overcoming 
social resistance in poor communities. 
 
Sustainable development discourse has also been used to facilitate the appropriation of 
nature and the resulting negative impacts by making social and environmental initiatives 
conditional on the economic activity of a CDM project. This crude application of the 
conflation between economic growth and sustainability is illustrated by the JSW Energy 
sponge-iron project in Karnataka, India. The  project’s  activities  release  toxic  effluent 
including heavy metals into groundwater, dumps solid waste, and pollutes the air with 
fly ash (Lohmann 2006:260). On the other hand, the project developers promised to use 
income derived from the project to supply electricity, construct roads, operate health 
clinics, and provide employment  opportunities,  on  top  of  the  project’s  reduction  in 
greenhouse gas emissions from the generation of electricity from waste gases (Mate & 
Ghosh 2009b:28). The provision by private companies of social services that are 
conditional on economic activity reflects an acceptance of the Rio discourse that 
embraced private actors as the drivers of sustainability (Paton 2008:109). None of the 
‘sustainable  development’  pledges  were  carried  out  by  the  company  (Mate & Ghosh 
2009b:28). However, the piecemeal nature these promises also demonstrates an 
understanding of sustainability that is devoid of any notion of ecological and social 
interdependencies. Even if each of the initiatives was carried out, the ecological 
destruction caused by toxic pollution cannot under any measure be considered to be 
offset by a health facility. Piecemeal and conditional social and environmental 
protections or services, which reflect dominant understandings of sustainable 
development, facilitate negative impacts if they are not pursued as a whole.  
 
The partial capitalisation of nature in the CDM also works against the adoption of 
production practices that may reduce pollution other than greenhouse gas emissions. In 
2008 the Karnataka State Pollution Control Board noted that none of the sponge-iron 
plants in the Bellary region, including the JSW Energy project, were employing 
technologies, such as  ‘electrostatic precipitators’,  that  reduce pollution by filtering the 
fine metals and gases which are discharged from the factories (Mumtaz & Yasmin 
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2009:17). Similarly, the AT Biopower project in Phichit, Thailand, which burns rice 
husk to generate electricity, has dumped its ash waste in local communities, rather than 
recycling it for its potential use in cement production (Gilbertson 2009a:69).  In both 
cases,  the  CDM’s  partial  capitalisation  of  nature  worked  against  the  less  polluting 
alternatives. Only carbon sinks are capitalised under the CDM, and therefore in the 
absence of state regulation, and the non-enforcement of sustainable development 
criteria, CDM projects simply appropriate ecosystem services as waste sinks for non-
greenhouse gas pollution if represents the least-cost option.  
 
Conclusion: Legitimising crisis displacement  
 
The experience of Indian CDM projects illustrates the serious negative impacts on local 
communities and ecosystems that results from the displacement of the climate change 
crisis to the  level  of  CDM  projects  in  developing  countries.  The  CDM’s  partial 
capitalisation of nature restructures local space around CDM projects through its dual 
character whereby internalisation of carbon sinks as capital depends on the 
appropriation of uncapitalised nature. Rather than protecting ecosystems and 
communities  from  the  costs  of  the  CDM’s  crisis  displacement,  the  concept  of 
sustainable development has both facilitated the negative impacts and provided the 
process with significant legitimacy. It has facilitated the negative impacts because the 
dominant understanding of the concept conflates the economic activities of CDM 
projects with sustainability. However, the concept also retains widespread legitimacy, 
courtesy of its popularly recognised meaning as "development that meets the needs of 
the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own 
needs” (Meadowcroft 2000:270, WCED 1987). The notion of sustainable development 
therefore not only facilitates crisis displacement but also legitimises the CDM at the 
national and international levels. The following chapter turns to the temporal dynamics 
of the CDM by analysing the role of the capitalisation of carbon sinks in displacing 
climate change as a crisis of the second contradiction through time. 
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Chapter four 
Displacement through time and emerging 
contradictions 
 
 
The appropriation of uncapitalised nature, instituted by the dual character if the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM), has caused significant negative impacts on local 
communities and ecosystems at the CDM project level. The first section of this chapter 
analyses the other half of the CDM’s dual character - the capitalisation of carbon sinks - 
and the implications of capitalisation for the climate change crisis. Using examples from 
‘as if’ and technological CDM projects, the section argues that the CDM is based on a 
notional capitalisation of carbon sinks and consequently reproduces the climate system 
at the level of social imagination only. Therefore, as a partial and notional capitalisation 
of nature, the CDM displaces the climate crisis through space and time, because it 
contributes to a future intensification of global warming as a second contradiction of 
capitalism. 
 
The social and environmental impacts of the CDM’s spatial and temporal displacement 
have engendered a growing social resistance from social movements towards states. 
Juxtaposed with this resistance has been conflict between and within capital and states 
over the institutional developments required for the continued existence and expansion 
of the CDM. The second and third sections of this chapter analyse the different currents 
of this contestation at the international, national, and local levels, in terms of democratic 
state strategy by social movements, and the conflicting interests for different fractions 
of capital inherent in the accumulation imperatives of the CDM. Together, these 
conflicts represent emerging contradictions within the state-based social structures that 
wholly support the functioning of the CDM market, and demonstrate the role of the 
agency of social forces in continually shaping the dynamics of second contradictions.  
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The notional capitalisation of nature  
 
The  capitalisation  of  nature  represents  a  “rhetorical  harmonisation”  between  the 
accumulation  of  capital  and  the  reproduction  of  nature  because  “capital  is  nature  and 
nature  is capital”  (M. O’Connor 1993:18). However, Martin O’Connor (1993:24) also 
contends that in the concrete global political economy, the capitalisation of nature has 
principally  occurred  at  the  “social  imaginary  level”,  corresponding  with  “largely 
imaginary management”. The CDM follows this logic through a notional capitalisation 
of carbon sinks which represent an imaginary management of the climate system. First, 
‘as if’ projects remove projected greenhouse gases from imaginary future scenarios that 
are socially constructed using flawed assumptions. Second, technological projects 
remove real, but by-product, greenhouse gases which produce Certified Emission 
Reductions (CERs) that are outweighed by the climatic impact of the primary 
greenhouse gas for which there is no technological carbon sink. 
 
‘As if’ carbon sinks 
‘As if’ CDM projects do not reduce greenhouse gases emissions in real terms. Instead, 
carbon sinks are capitalised because projects claim to emit a lesser quantity of 
greenhouse gases than would have occurred without the CDM project. These projects 
therefore operate ‘as if’ they are removing greenhouse gases from a future scenario. The 
‘reduction’  in  greenhouse  gases  by  CDM  projects is calculated using  a  ‘baseline 
methodology’  which  constructs  counterfactual  ‘business-as-usual’  scenarios of 
emissions  trajectories.  ‘As  if’  carbon  sink  projects  only notionally capitalise carbon 
sinks because they reduce emissions from a socially constructed scenario of emissions 
that is either fraudulent, or more fundamentally, does not need to exist because of a 
poverty in the understanding of historical development in the design of CDM baselines.  
 
There is strong evidence that a large proportion of renewable energy projects, which 
represent  the majority of ‘as if’ projects, as well as 60 percent of total CDM projects, 
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are producing fraudulent CERs (UNEP 2010b). These projects only notionally capitalise 
carbon sinks because it can be proved that the greenhouse gas emissions from which 
CERs are calculated would never have existed. For example, the Project Design 
Document of the Allain Duhangan Hydroelectric Project in Himachal Pradesh, India, 
claims that without CDM status, future power requirements would be met through fossil 
fuel-based sources (ADPL 2007:5). This has been demonstrated as a false claim by the 
South Asian Network on Dams, Rivers and People (SANDRP) because the project has 
been in the process of development since 1993, well before the advent of the CDM. 
Referring to the CER revenue it is set to receive, SANDRP has labelled the project the 
“75 million dollar fraud” because it would have been built regardless of CDM revenue 
and therefore the emissions from fossil fuel energy sources were never going to exist 
(Thakkar  2008:1).  This  form  of  ‘non-additionality’  is  endemic  in  renewable  energy 
projects more generally. For example, in 2007 International Rivers found that over 96 
percent of China’s then 236 large hydropower projects were under construction before 
CDM registration was pursued (Haya 2007:6).  
 
Beyond non-additional ‘fraud’, all ‘as if’ CDM projects fundamentally only notionally 
capitalise carbon sinks due to the flawed assumptions inherent in baseline 
methodologies. CERs are calculated according to the difference between the smaller 
quantity of greenhouse gas emissions resulting from the CDM project, and the larger 
quantity of greenhouse gas emissions that would have occurred from the alternatives to 
the CDM project. However, the ‘would have occurred otherwise’ is socially constructed 
using inadequate economic models which assume that historical development is entirely 
determined by rational companies responding to market forces, in abstraction from the 
concrete social formation. The key principles informing the construction of baseline 
scenarios are the need  to  be  “realistic”  and  “credible”  (UNFCCC 2008:5). But the 
interpretation of realism and credibility is restricted to the reading of market forces by 
the private consultancy firm26 that prepares the Project Design Document, according to 
whether the alternative scenarios are “economically or financially attractive” (UNFCCC 
2008:5). This represents an inadequate understanding of the contingency of historical 
                                                 
26In UNFCCC terms, a Designated Operational Entity (DOE). 
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development, which also proceeds from a complex combination of non-market social 
forces and the political construction of market forces.  
 
The fallacy of excluding social considerations is illustrated by the AT Biopower project 
in Phichit, Thailand, which earns CERs by generating electricity from rice husk, a 
‘waste’  product from rice production. The Project Design Document used an 
‘investment  analysis’  to  find  the  only  “credible”  alternative  scenario  is  the methane-
emitting practice of “uncontrolled burning or dumping” of rice husk (ATB 2007:17,29). 
Contrary to this scenario, rice husk is used by communities surrounding the project to 
absorb animal manure which in turn is used as a natural fertiliser, or as an input for 
traditional brick manufacturing (Gilbertson 2009a:59). The project is projected to 
‘reduce’  41,881 tonnes of carbon pollution over seven years (and produce the same 
number of CERs) by avoiding methane emissions from rice husk that would be dumped 
or burned in a world of rational profit-seeking actors (ATB 2007:35). However, in the 
Sa Luang community alongside the biomass project, the use of rice husk is contingent 
on other social forces such as traditional agricultural practices (Gilbertson 2009a:58-
59). Such abstraction is useful in maximising the production of CERs, but can only be 
conceived of as a notional capitalisation of nature.  
 
Technological carbon sinks 
Unlike ‘as if’ CDM projects which reduce greenhouse gases from imaginary baselines, 
technological projects remove actually existing greenhouse gases from the atmosphere 
through industrial destruction processes. The most common form of this type of project 
is HFC-23 industrial gas destruction projects. There are only nineteen operational HFC-
23 destruction projects, but they represent a disproportional 51 percent of total CERs 
issued to date (UNEP 2010b). HFC-23 destruction projects only notionally capitalise 
carbon sinks because the destruction of HFC-23 depends on the production of a primary 
greenhouse gas which outweighs the carbon sink capacity of the technologically 
produced CER.  
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HFC-23 is a greenhouse gas by-product from the production of the refrigerant gas 
HCFC-22 (McCulloch 2005:iii). HFC-23 is a potent greenhouse gas with a 100-year 
Global Warming Potential (GWP) of 11,700 (IPCC 1995:121). This means that one 
tonne of HFC-23 is equivalent in its contribution to global warming to 11,700 tonnes of 
carbon dioxide. HFC-23  is  destroyed  through  a  ‘thermal  oxidation’  process  which 
converts the greenhouse gas into salt form (McCulloch 2005:iv). However, HCFC-22 is 
itself a potent greenhouse gas, with a 100 year GWP of 1,500 (IPCC 1995:119). Hence, 
the capitalisation of carbon sinks through the destruction of HFC-23 is wholly reliant on 
the production of another type of greenhouse gas, which is also an ozone depleting 
substance under the Montreal Protocol (EIA 2010:2). Furthermore, the destruction of 
one tonne of carbon dioxide-equivalent of HFC-23 requires the production of 
approximately 3.12 tonnes of carbon dioxide-equivalent of HCFC-2227. Therefore, the 
CERs produced in HFC-23 destruction projects are only notional carbon sinks because 
they are outweighed in climatic terms by the necessary production of HCFC-22, for 
which there is no technological carbon sink under the CDM.  
 
Notional sinks for real carbon 
The problems associated with the notional capitalisation of carbon sinks by ‘as if’ and 
technological CDM projects are compounded when CERs are used to offset real carbon 
emissions by capital and states with emissions reduction requirements. For example, the 
                                                 
27 Author’s calculation based on least efficient (i.e. maximum possible emission reduction) HCFC-
22:HFC-23 ratio and IPCC (1995:119,121) GWPs. 
1 tonne of HCFC-22 has a GWP of 1,500.  
The production of one tonne of HCFC-22 produces between 0.0137 and 0.04 tonnes of HFC-23 waste gas 
(McCulloch 2005:iv). 
Producing 1 tonne HCFC-22 produces 0.04 tonnes of HFC-23 using least efficient ratio. 
HFC-23 has a GWP of 11,700.  
0.04 tonnes of HFC-23 has a GWP of 468. 
The destruction of 468 tonnes of CO2-e of HFC-23 requires the production of 1,500 tonnes of CO2-e of 
HCFC-22, because 1 tonne of HCFC-22 has a GWP of 1,500. 
Therefore, destroying 1 tonne of CO2-e of HFC-23 is outweighed by the required production of 3.12 
tonnes of CO2-e of HCFC-22. 
This is an underestimate because it also assumes all HFC-23 is destroyed and excludes other fossil fuel-
intensive energy used in the production of HCFC-22 and the destruction of HFC-23.  
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100,678 CERs produced by the AT Biopower project discussed above have been 
purchased by companies including Chubu Electric Power in Japan, which surrenders 
CERs to offset emissions associated with their fossil fuel-based power stations 
(UNFCCC 2010e, ATB 2007:5, Chubu Electric 2006). This use value defines the CDM 
as an instrument which facilitates an immediate increase in overall greenhouse gas 
emissions, because it permits the continued free appropriation of natural carbon sinks by 
capital in developed countries.  
 
Contrary to the rhetorical harmonisation between capital accumulation and the 
reproduction of nature, the CDM is an imaginary means of managing the climate 
system. All CERs are fundamentally based on the assumption that greenhouse gas 
emissions, from the combustion of fossil fuels in ‘as if’ projects and the production of 
HCFC-22 in technological projects, are justified by the existence of market demand. 
This is the same rationale that underpins the displacement of responses to climate 
change to CDM projects in developing countries, because the polluting activities of 
capital in developed countries are more profitable. Hence, the CDM facilitates an 
immediate increase in greenhouse gas emissions, and reinforces the notion that 
pollution is legitimised by market forces, despite being a social and political decision 
which can, and must, be restricted if the impacts of climate change are going to be 
reduced. Together, these points combine towards an intensification of the social and 
ecological crises caused by future climate change. Therefore, the CDM contributes to a 
displacement of global warming as a second contradiction of capitalism through time. 
 
Emerging contradictions between social movements and states 
 
In struggles surrounding second contradictions, social movements are the principal 
agents  of  social  transformation  (O’Connor  1998:161).  The  negative impacts of CDM 
projects, coupled with its imaginary management of the climate system, have 
engendered  a  growing  resistance  from  social  movements.  Karl  Polanyi’s  (1944:130) 
concept  of  the  socially  protective  “counter-movement”  is  useful  in  understanding  the 
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dynamics of these resistances. Polanyi (1944:76) argued that nineteenth century history 
was  characterised  by  a  “double  movement”  in  which  the  extension of free-market 
principles to ‘fictitious commodities’ – land, labour, and money – was restricted by the 
counter-movements of society due to the social and natural dislocations that were 
caused.  The  “principle[s]  of  economic  liberalism”  that  advocated  these nineteenth 
century extensions were evident in the development of the CDM as a means for 
achieving economic efficiency in managing the climate system (Polanyi 1944:132). But 
just  as  the  “self-regulating market”  - in large part due to social counter-movements - 
was only ever a “utopian” vision, so too are the free market principles that underpin the 
CDM (Polanyi 1944:141).   
 
Chapter two argued that the CDM market is constituted by a vast social structure 
underpinned by cooperation between states and capital. Various environmental groups 
have operated within this social space as counter-movements to aspects of the CDM in 
response to the  social  and  environmental  damage  it  has  caused.  James  O’Connor 
(1998:308,310) argues that all social movements contesting conditions of production 
must engage with the state and all implicitly have the same fundamental goal of 
“democratising  the  state”.  Democratising the state through participation in state 
processes is a current that runs through each of the struggles discussed below, although 
with different political goals and strategies. Differences stem from the varying interests 
at the local and international levels, although each level informs the other. Local 
resistance is often an immediate defence of livelihood, whereas international struggles 
have tended to resist the imposition of free market principles as the guiding force in 
climate change policies. Counter-movements directed towards the state and against the 
CDM represent emerging contradictions within the state-based social structures which 
support the use value and exchange value of Certified Emission Reductions (CERs). On 
the other hand, social movements have encountered difficulties in their resistance 
stemming from the political power of states and capital, in part due to conflicts between 
different social movements. These differences are evident in the alternative visions of 
democratisation in each struggle, which include state accountability, specific or 
wholesale democratic production of state content, and distributional equity. 
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Making the state accountable 
A first form of international counter-movement attempts to make United Nations CDM 
institutions more accountable through project-by-project submissions. In order for a 
project to be validated and then registered, a United Nations approved consultant must 
subject the Project Design Document to a 30-day public comment period (CDM Watch 
2010a:15). Environmental non-governmental organisation (NGO), International Rivers 
(2010) has submitted comments on at least twenty-five proposed hydropower projects 
under these regulations. Each comment argues that an individual project should not be 
validated on the basis that it does not adhere to CDM rules, such as additionality (e.g. 
International Rivers 2009), stakeholder consultation (e.g. International Rivers 2008), or 
sustainable development (e.g. International Rivers 2007). The participation by 
International Rivers represents a counter-movement because the organisation is 
challenging the role of market profitability as the driver of the capitalisation of carbon 
sinks by appealing to alternative environmental and social standards. International 
Rivers is informed by evidence gathered from local resistances, and supports those 
resistances in their immediate political goal of preventing individual projects gaining 
CDM registration. There has been some success to this end. Of the sixteen projects 
commented on which have come to a final decision, seven have been denied validation28 
(International Rivers 2010, UNEP 2010b).  
 
International Rivers is attempting to democratise the international state institutions that 
govern the CDM by making them more accountable to their own rules. This threatens 
the CDM market at the project stage because there is no guarantee of the state-granted 
CDM status that is required for the production and realisation of profits from CERs. 
However, the project-by-project nature of this counter-movement poses difficulties 
arising from disparities between civil society resources and the state. For example, the 
Chinese state plans to install 100 gigawatts of hydropower capacity between 2010 and 
2015 (Sehlleier & Michaelowa 2010b:4). The plan equates to 3,048 average-sized 
                                                 
28 It is not possible to know the direct influence of comments because Designated Operational Entities, 
unlike the Executive Board, do not publically publish reasons for non-validation publically.   
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Chinese CDM hydropower projects29, and demonstrates the resource and power 
imbalance problems associated with project-by-project resistance, due to the many 
projects which are not subject to the enforcement of state accountability.   
 
Producing the content of the state 
A second form of international counter-movement goes beyond state accountability 
according to pre-existing rules, to challenging and producing the content of specific 
aspects of those rules through democratic participation. CDM regulations have 
provisions for reviews into the rules that govern CDM projects (CDM Watch 2010a:13-
14). CDM Watch has taken advantage of this social space to trigger a state review into 
the HFC-23 project regulations. In a review of company documents, the NGO found 
that current regulations have allowed projects to increase their production of HCFC-22 
purely in order to maximise their issuance of CERs through the destruction of the HFC-
23 by-product (CDM Watch 2010b:2). CDM Watch’s (2010b:2,12) immediate political 
goal of bringing about a major revision to HFC-23 regulations seeks to limit the 
quantity of fraudulent carbon sinks produced in the CDM. Governing institutions have 
also been responsive to this political end. The Methodology Panel accepted each of 
CDM Watch’s  concerns  as  “major  issues  that  require  attention” (UNFCCC 2010f:2). 
The Executive Board has indicated it will make a decision on a revision to the HFC-23 
methodology in the November 2010 meeting, and has placed on hold the issuance of 
CERs for all HFC-23 projects (UNFCCC 2010g:8, 2010h). 
 
The form of counter-movement instigated by CDM Watch attempts to strengthen 
environmental and social standards by producing the content of specific CDM state 
rules. It poses a threat to the functioning of the CDM market because the non-material 
nature of CERs means that it is state rules which finally determine the production of 
CERs  as  tradable  commodities.  Indeed,  if  CDM  Watch’s  revision  of those rules 
succeeds, 90 percent of currently allowed HFC-23 CERs will not be issued in the next 
                                                 
29 On 1 September 2010 there were 454 registered hydropower project activities in China, with an average 
size of 32.8 MW (UNEP 2010b).  
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crediting period (CDM Watch 2010c:1). This will have serious implications for the 
CDM market because HFC-23 projects represent 51 percent of total CERs issued to date 
(UNEP 2010b). However, the threat to profitability has triggered concerted opposition. 
In particular, the World Bank (2010a, 2010b) has initiated a counter-campaign to defend 
the legitimacy of HFC-23 projects.  
 
The World  Bank’s T1 Umbrella Carbon Facility has financed two Chinese HFC-23 
projects, purchasing 129.3 million CERs worth over 1.7 billion Euros at current market 
prices30. This financing is on behalf of government carbon funds, investment banks, and 
large energy companies, including the Danish Carbon Fund, Deutsche Bank, and Tokyo 
Electric Power Co. (World Bank 2010c). These are institutions with considerable 
political power and significant economic rather than environmental and social interests 
in preserving the CDM market  in  its current form. CDM Watch’s resistance is further 
complicated by alternative political strategies from other environmental NGOs that 
avoid this form of direct engagement with the state. For example, fifty-one 
environmental NGOs, led by the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), in partnership 
with carbon finance companies such as Merrill Lynch Commodities, have developed a 
‘Gold Standard’  system of parallel CDM rules. The system certifies  ‘premium’ CERs 
according to stronger emissions reduction and sustainable development standards, but 
on a voluntary basis only (GSF 2010).   
 
Democratising the international climate change regime 
A third form of international counter-movement aims to for a wholesale democratisation 
of state content by campaigning for the abolition of the CDM in the context of a 
stronger  international  climate  change  regime.  The  ‘climate  justice  movement31’ has 
been active in this regard.  Chapter two  discussed  the  ‘Linking  Directive’  which 
integrates the CDM into the European Union (EU) Emissions Trading Scheme, 
underpinning 90 percent of international demand for CERs. The de facto governance 
                                                 
30 CER market price at 13 September 2010 was 13.69 Euros (Jenkin 2010) 
31 Refers to ecology, indigenous, and other social justice groups associated with the principles of the 
Climate Justice Now! Network and the Durban Declaration on Climate Justice (CJN! 2010, DGCJ 2004). 
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that  this affords  the EU over  the CDM meant  that  the ‘Climate and Energy Package’, 
the basis for EU climate policy from 2013-2020, was proactively contested by climate 
justice groups. Friends of the Earth, Europe used public consultation provisions to 
completely oppose the use of CERs in achieving compliance with emissions reduction 
targets (FoE-EU 2008:2, Girling 2010:5). The position was consistent with Friends of 
the Earth, UK’s wider campaign for states to abandon the CDM and all other forms of 
offsetting (Bullock et al. 2009:28).  
 
The Linking Directive provides CERs with a state-sanctioned use value for meeting 
emissions reduction requirements32. Friends of the Earth’s immediate political goal of a 
total ban on CER integration would significantly reduce the CDM market because it 
would remove most of the state-instituted demand for CERs. However, the resistance 
was not successful in preventing the use of CERs as the final package allows at least 50 
percent of reductions to be met through CERs, worth up to 65 billion Euros (Pew 
2009:2). One  reason  for  this  lack  of  success  is  the  widespread  support  for  ‘flexible 
mechanisms’  by  national  and  international  states,  discussed  in  the  Introduction  and 
Chapter two. Indeed, most national state members of the EU were against any offset 
limits in the original Linking Directive (Flam 2008:28). In this context, and compared to 
the 88 percent limit in the current phase (2008-12), the contestation by Friends of the 
Earth and other environmental groups resulted in some restriction of the use of CERs, 
and demonstrates the role of the agency of social movements in the continual 
construction of the CDM market.  
 
Local defence of livelihood and tradition 
The negative impacts of CDM projects on communities and ecosystems, illustrated by 
case studies in this and the previous chapter, have generated waves of local opposition 
by affected peoples. Joan Martinez-Alier’s  (2002) notion of  the  ‘environmentalism of 
the  poor’  is  useful for understanding this opposition because the struggles are 
                                                 
32 Another less important use value is for companies wishing to publicise their ‘green’ credentials as 
‘carbon neutral’.  
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fundamentally over the distribution of the ecological impacts of state policies. 
Environmentalism of the poor is a current of environmentalism that arises when 
indigenous, peasant, rural and urban groups, mostly in developing countries, resist 
disproportionate environmental impacts of economic activities (Martinez-Alier 
2002:11). The immediate political means and goals of this form of resistance are site 
specific, and indeed are multiple between different social groups at specific sites, but 
share common themes. In particular, like counter-movements at the international level, 
the nature of the CDM means that all environmentalisms of the poor must confront 
states. In turn, the pursuit of state democratisation in terms of distributional equity is 
hindered by the unequal power relations between affected communities, states, and 
capital that are behind the negative impacts of CDM projects. 
 
Environmentalisms of the poor, including local resistances to CDM projects, are 
generally characterised by a defence of tradition and/or livelihood (Martinez-Alier 
2002:11). For example, indigenous groups have appealed to the links between tradition 
and nature in occupying the site of the Dardanelos Hydropower Project in Mato Grosso, 
Brazil, which is situated on a traditional burial ground (The Age 2010). Similar direct 
actions have been used to assert interests in nature as a means of livelihood by 
communities affected by CDM projects. For example, community members of Sarona 
village attempted to physically block the construction of the Bhilangana Dam in 
Uttarakhand, India, because the dam was upstream from the village’s essential irrigation 
systems (Gilbertson 2009b:22). However, the state-capital ‘partnerships’  rationale  that 
drives the CDM intertwines resistance against capital with resistance against the 
political, and sometimes violent, force of the state. In the case of the Bhilangana Dam, 
the resisting villagers were repeatedly arrested and jailed, and the project was 
constructed and registered (Gilbertson 2009b:22). Problems which stem from 
confronting the political power of states are common in local CDM counter-movements. 
The Sasan supercritical coal power project discussed in the previous chapter was 
awarded from a Government of India tendering process, and the appropriation of land 
was carried out by the District Magistrate (Nandi et al. 2009:46). Community members 
seeking increased compensation through government appeal processes are therefore 
facing the difficulty of appealing against the dispossessing institution itself.  
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On the one hand, the dual character of the CDM between the capitalisation of carbon 
sinks and appropriation of nature has resulted in serious negative impacts on local 
communities. On the other hand, the physical requirement of land for the capitalisation 
of carbon sinks provides a geographical space for local resistances to disrupt the 
production of CERs in individual CDM projects. Local resistance is also intertwined 
with the international level. For example, the South Asian Network on Dams, Rivers, 
and People (2006) documented the social and environmental issues of the Bhilangana 
Dam in comments submitted to the Executive Board. However, many of the problems 
associated project-by-project resistance, such as the resource disparities between social 
movements  and  states,  are  more  acute  in  local  resistances.  The  ‘clean  development’ 
narrative that surrounds CDM projects is a powerful discourse in the context of climate 
change. It underscores the paradox of the state-based structure of the CDM, which both 
provides political space for social counter-movements to contest, but also creates power 
imbalances because contestation is against the political power of states in clean 
development partnerships with capital.           
 
Emerging contradictions between capital and states 
 
In addition to contestation between social movements and states, conflict between and 
within capital and states represents a considerable emerging contradiction within the 
state-based social structure of the CDM market. At the United Nations, national states 
have not negotiated the binding international climate change agreement that is needed to 
provide legal grounding for the CDM after the Kyoto Protocol period expires in 2012. 
Nor  have  domestic  legislators  in  the  United  States  (US)  enacted  a  ‘cap  and  trade’ 
scheme that is required for the future expansion of demand for CERs. There is 
widespread support by states for offsetting mechanisms in principle, as well as 
significant profit-making opportunities for capitals which participate in the CDM 
market. However, the current state of affairs is due to a contradiction in the social 
structure of the CDM. The contradiction is that the demand for CERs, above what is 
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compensated for by states, must be underpinned by state regulation of greenhouse gas 
emissions that is costly for fractions of capital which are fossil fuel-intensive.  
 
This contradiction is symptomatic of one of the fundamental contradictions of 
capitalism between use value and exchange value. A commodity must have an exchange 
value in order for production to occur, and a commodity must also have a use value in 
order for it to be purchased (Jessop 2002:16). CERs are commodities with both an 
exchange value to be realised in the CDM market, and a use value for states and capital 
with socially imposed carbon emissions reduction requirements. As demonstrated in 
Chapter two, states have cooperated to overcome this contradiction by providing social 
structures which underpin the production, exchange, and demand of CERs. To date, the 
potential costs of emission reduction targets have been financially subsidised by states. 
In particular, the current phase of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme gives 92 percent 
of EU carbon credits to polluting companies for free (Newell & Paterson 2010:101), 
which in turn effectively subsidises the cost of CERs. However, in recent times national 
and international states have been unable to extend these state-based social structures 
due to conflict between and within states and capitals.  
 
Conflict between the US and China has been popularly attributed as the reason national 
states have failed to negotiate a successor to the Kyoto Protocol (Bond 2010:14). Others 
have characterised it not as conflict, but  rather  a  tacit  agreement  between  “powerful 
conspirators” for the “right to pollute” (Narain 2010). The essential relations behind this 
impasse can be understood with the example of the failure of US emissions trading 
legislation, which holds the greatest potential for an expansion in the CDM market, to 
pass the US Senate.  The  ‘Waxman-Markey’  bill  that  passed  the  US  House  of 
Representatives in 2009 had provisions for up to 1.5 billion international offsets, such as 
CERs, to be used each year (American Clean Energy & Security Act 2009:742). This 
yearly quantity is greater than the total issued CERs to date and would therefore create a 
significant expansion of the CDM market. However, the US Senate has not voted in 
favour of any of the corresponding bills needed for the emissions trading scheme to 
become operational (Kirk 2010). 
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The high quantity of offsets, subsidies to polluters, and the removal of Environmental 
Protection Agency powers drew opposition from climate justice groups (Bond 2010:18). 
However, the failure of Congress to pass the bill has been primarily due to opposition 
from fractions of capital that are fossil fuel intensive. The Waxman-Markey bill was 
supported by finance, biotechnology, and renewable energy capital, set to profit from 
the emissions trading scheme, including participation in the CDM (US House 2009). 
But this and other climate legislation has been opposed by other fractions of capital that 
are fossil fuel-intensive. The opposition is due to the fact that at least some of the 
financial gains from fractions of capital set to benefit from the CDM, will materialise as 
costs to those companies with (albeit minimal) emissions reduction requirements. This 
is because the demand for CERs is derived from social barriers to capital in the form of 
greenhouse gas targets. While the CDM provides a means to overcome such barriers, it 
cannot wholly overcome them. This is because, beyond that which is subsidised by the 
state, the purchase of CERs represents an increased cost to the individual capitals which 
finally surrender them. It has been estimated that the oil, coal, and gas companies and 
their industry groups have spent US$532 million in lobbying against the proposed 
legislation over the course of the one-and-a-half year public debate (Weiss et al. 2010). 
Much of this opposition has been in the form of direct donations to legislators, as well 
as channelled through neoliberal think-tanks. For example, the Competitive Enterprise 
Institute, has effectively labelled the most recent US Senate bill a “cap and tax” scheme 
that will reduce US international competitiveness (Murray & Yeatman 2010). Such 
opposition was successful in forcing the Senate in July 2010 to defer any consideration 
of an emissions trading scheme until 2011 (Sehlleier & Michaelowa 2010c:1).  
 
Conclusion: The contradictions of planned markets  
 
Extensive roles for states in markets create tensions between capital flexibility and state 
planning.  The  World  Bank  (2010d:3)  has  lamented  that  “rules,  modalities,  and 
procedures, which were developed to ensure a rigorous project approval process and the 
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issuance of credible emission credits, have inadvertently resulted in excessive delays 
and bottlenecks”. An eighteen-month registration process with the United Nations, and 
then at least one more year before issuance of CERs, can run contrary to the 
expectations of individual capitals which invest in World Bank carbon funds. This 
demonstrates the contradictory nature of the state social structures of the CDM market 
because they are both necessary for a functioning market in natural conditions like 
carbon sinks, but at odds with the time-compressing logic of capital. This contradiction 
extends to the political space provided by state-structures for contestation between and 
within social movements, states, and capital. This chapter has argued these conflicts 
represent  emerging  contradictions  to  the  CDM’s  accumulation  imperatives  and 
supporting state social structures that were described in Chapter two. They also 
demonstrate that the social contestation which produced the CDM is an ever-continuing 
process that continues to construct the CDM market based on the political power of 
states, capital, and social movements. Some of the implications of this contestation for 
global warming in the current political economic context are considered in the 
conclusion to this thesis.  
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Conclusion 
  
The Kyoto Protocol ostensibly defines the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) as 
an environmental instrument  for  preventing  “dangerous  anthropocentric  interference 
with the climate system” (UNFCCC 1992:4, 1997:11). However, this thesis has applied 
an ecological Marxist framework to argue that the CDM is a state-led economic 
instrument designed to permit the accumulation of capital through the emerging climate 
change crisis. The significant profits made by capital participating in the CDM market, 
and the avoidance of costs for capital facing greenhouse gas emission restrictions, 
demonstrates that crises of capital underproduction stemming from second 
contradictions are contingent on social contestation. While the demands of social 
movements in the context of the Kyoto Protocol had the potential to contribute towards 
such a crisis, those demands were used by states as the impetus for the institution of 
Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) as a new form of commodity production. Capital 
has therefore been able to overcome its potential social barriers by accumulating 
through them.  
 
However, the process of overcoming barriers to capital has not been without costs. The 
peoples and environments in developing countries - which are projected to be most 
affected by climate change - have also been most affected by the CDM as an instrument 
to ‘mitigate’ the impacts of climate change. The CDM has displaced the climate change 
crisis through space to the level of CDM projects in developing countries, and in doing 
so has shifted the costs of restructuring to local communities and ecosystems around 
CDM projects. This displacement underpins the capital accumulation imperatives of the 
CDM as an economic instrument by permitting the continued free appropriation of the 
climate system as a carbon sink by capital in developed countries. It also renders the 
CDM as an ultimately false means of maintaining the climate system, which therefore 
displaces the global warming crisis through time by intensifying future climate change 
as a second contradiction of capitalism. 
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The use of space and time as a means for capital to overcome the first contradiction of 
capitalism is commonly understood by Marxists. Harvey (2003:115), for example, has 
theorised “spatio-temporal” fixes to overproduction as a “particular kind of solution to 
capitalist crises through temporal deferral and geographical expansion”. This thesis has 
used the CDM as a case study to demonstrate that capitalism also restructures global 
and local space to attempt to overcome crises of the second contradiction. Themes of 
spatial  configurations  are  present  in  O’Connor’s  project,  but  they  remain  somewhat 
underdeveloped.  Firstly,  O’Connor  (1998:145) lists human-made space alongside 
human labour and the natural environment as one of the three conditions of capitalist 
production,  although  his  focus  is  primarily  on  the  latter.  Secondly,  O’Connor 
(1998:167) emphasises the restructuring of natural conditions in order to overcome 
crises of the second contradiction, which implies a spatial element. Thirdly, O’Connor 
(1998:51,273-4) discusses the site-specificity of ecological problems and struggles. 
However, he warns against the equation of site specificity with the purely local, because 
the local is shaped by regional, national, and global scales, which are interdependent.    
 
This thesis has more thoroughly extended these spatial themes into the theoretical 
framework of the second contradiction. The CDM uses global space to restructure the 
climate system according to the divide between developed and developing countries that 
materialises in global environmental politics. A further spatial tension exists at the 
CDM project level whereby the capitalisation of carbon sinks requires the appropriation 
of nature. The impacts of this dual character, including the dispossession of land and the 
toxic pollution of ecosystems, are to a certain degree site-specific. However, this 
restructuring of local space is also constituted by global dynamics. It is structurally 
defined by  the CDM’s partial capitalisation of nature  instituted at  the United Nations, 
and facilitated and legitimised by globally dominant understandings of sustainable 
development.  
 
In combination, the CDM’s  restructuring  of  global  and  local  space  form  spatial 
conditions of capitalist production. As spatial configurations, they underpin the 
accumulation imperatives inherent in the production of CERs, as well as the 
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commitment to the unfettered accumulation of capital embodied in the surrendering of 
CERs as capitalised carbon sinks. While this restructuring is organised through the 
CDM market, it is the product of national and international states. Indeed, each moment 
of the CDM market is wholly constituted by state structures, in contradiction to the 
CDM’s  ideological  basis  as  a  free  market  instrument.  Like  natural  conditions  of 
production, spatial conditions enter into dialectical relationships with societies and the 
natural environment. The spatial conditions that organise the CDM are socially 
constructed by states, but have also reconstructed local communities, ecosystems, and 
the climate to devastating effect.  
 
Continuing  the  dialectic  between  conditions  of  production  and  society,  the  CDM’s 
spatial and temporal displacement of the climate change crisis has engendered a 
growing social resistance to the CDM from social movements. Conversely, opposition 
from fractions of capital threatened by the climate change policies that underpin the 
demand for CERs, illustrates that spatial fixes to barriers to capital are not without their 
own contradictions for capital. This thesis has demonstrated that the social contestation 
between and within states, social movements, and capital over the climate system, 
which produced the CDM, is an ever-ongoing process. In conjunction with (second-) 
natural processes, this contestation continues to construct the dynamics of climate 
change as a second contradiction of capitalism. On the one hand, contestation represents 
an emerging contradiction to the state social structures necessary to secure the existence 
and extension of the CDM market. On the other hand, the conflict is in the political 
economic context of United Nations climate change negotiations and domestic climate 
change policies, which will be major determining factors in the extent of social and 
ecological damage caused by global warming. 
 
The reduction in carbon pollution trajectories in developing countries will be an 
important component in an effective global response to climate change. However, the 
means for achieving this goal must be embedded in principles of social justice and 
ecological integrity. The capitalisation of carbon sinks is completely incompatible with 
these requirements. The critique in this thesis of the  CDM’s  partial  and  notional 
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capitalisation is not a defence of genuine capitalisation of nature, because the 
capitalisation of natural conditions can only ever be partial and notional. In contrast, the 
ecological and social damage caused by the CDM’s capitalisation of carbon sinks, and 
its deepening of the global warming crisis, will inevitably be replicated by the inclusion 
of the CDM, or offsetting instrument successor, in a post-Kyoto climate change 
agreement.  
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